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AN INSTRUMENTAL THEORY OF MARKET
POWER AND ANTITRUST POLICY
Jeffrey L. Harrison*
I. INTRODUCTION
INCE Judge Hand's pivotal opinion in United States v. Aluminum
Company of America (Alcoa),' the possession of monopoly power
has been treated as presumptively legal. The focus of the antitrust
laws since then has been on defining when that power is abused.2 This
approach to market power cannot be squared with the prevailing view
that antitrust law is grounded in economic theory. To understand why,
one must see market power for what it is: 3 the ability of a firm to raise
prices above competitive levels and to profitably keep them there. Seen
in this light, market power is indistinguishable from any other income-
generating asset. It can be bought and sold. Its ownership may be the
result of an extended period of risk-taking and investment, or it can be
the result of a windfall.
The allocation of market power has far-reaching implications from the
standpoint of social welfare and economic efficiency. For example, the
development and maintenance of market power is sometimes a side-ef-
fect of productive efforts making buyers or third parties better off. In
fact, monopoly power can be viewed as an instrument for increasing so-
cial welfare. When it is not, there is little in the way of social welfare
regarding reasons for monopoly power to exist, other than the possibility
that the cost of the administrative and judicial process for eliminating
monopoly exceeds the social gains of that effort. An "instrumental ap-
proach" to market power would reflect these possibilities. The result
would be that market power would be allocated only to those who make
others better off as they improve their own positions.
* Stephen C. O'Connell Chair and Professor of Law, The University of Florida Col-
lege of Law. Thanks to E. Thomas Sullivan, McCabe Harrison, and Sarah Wilson for their
comments on an earlier draft.
1. 148 F.2d 416, 432 (2d Cir. 1945).
2. See, e.g., Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605
(1985); Berkey Photo Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 275-76 (2d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980): United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295,
342-43 (D. Mass. 1953) affd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
3. The terms "market power" and "monopoly power" will be used synonymously.
Typically, monopoly power denotes a high degree of marker power, but even modest levels
of market power will allow a seller to raise prices above competitive levels. This ability to
deviate from competitive outcomes is the principle focus here.
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The presumptively legal approach to market power that does not re-
quire it to be allocated in a manner that advances social welfare is puz-
zling for a number of reasons. The first reason is that this approach is
inconsistent with the view that assets should be allocated in the most effi-
cient manner. This is a controversial view in many areas of the law, but in
antitrust, where efficiency is touted as the goal such an allocation would
be the means to that end. If efficiency were the true goal, the allocation
of market power as an asset would duplicate the allocation of market
power under conditions of zero transaction costs. If courts followed this
rationale, then monopoly power would be possessed by sellers only when
buyers are the net beneficiaries of that allocation.4 Under current inter-
pretations, however, transaction costs are viewed as an acceptable shelter
for those possessing market power rather than as impediments to effi-
ciency-producing transactions. 5 This implies that the non-instrumental
approach may also be regarded as a noneconomic approach. In fact,
under the modern interpretation of antitrust law, transaction costs are
used to legitimize status quo allocations of market power.
Second, the area of law that is a major complement to antitrust law,
intellectual property law, is devoted to the issue of when exclusivity-
which can lead to market power 6-should be granted as a means to the
end of advancing social welfare by encouraging innovative and creative
efforts. 7 In more technical terms, creative people are permitted to inter-
4. See infra notes 254-55 and accompanying text. There is no reason to treat the case
of monopsony power-market power on the buying side of the market-any differently.
In those instances, monopsony power would only be permitted as long as sellers are also
better off. See ROGER D. BLAIR & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, MONOPSONY: ANTITRUST LAW
AND ECONOMics 36-42 (1993).
5. See infra notes 171-72 and accompanying text.
6. It is a mistake to conclude that patents and copyrights, for example, lead to market
power. Many patents and copyrights are associated with inventions or compositions for
which there are many good substitutes. The presence of the substitutes means that the
owners of intellectual property will have little market power.
7. Perhaps the best known and clearest statement is Justice Potter Stewart's
observation:
The limited scope of the copyright holder's statutory monopoly, like the lim-
ited copyright duration required by the Constitution, reflects a balance of
competing claims upon the public interest: Creative work is to be encouraged
and rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of pro-
moting broad public availability of literature, music and the other arts. The
immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an 'au-
thor's' creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate
artistic creativity for the general public good.
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
See also Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)
("The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither unlimited nor prima-
rily designed to provide a special private benefit. Rather, the limited grant is a means by
which an important public purpose may be achieved."); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219
(1954) ("The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant pat-
ents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal
gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of author and inventors
in 'Science and useful Arts."'); United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158
(1948) ("The copyright law, like the patent statutes, makes reward to the owner a secon-
dary consideration."); Fox Film v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) ("The sole interest of the
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nalize the gains of their efforts to avoid free-riding and the impact that
would have on the motivation to attempt creative efforts.8 When it
comes to market power more generally, antitrust also deals with the ques-
tion of permitted internalization. But in this context, there is little or no
discussion about the economic justification for permitting that
internalization.
Third, the presumptively legal perspective is inconsistent with those
who have faith in the tendency of the law to evolve in the direction of
efficient rules. Powerful arguments have been made that many areas of
law that are not expressly economic in nature have often developed in
ways an economist would recommend. For example, many common law
results, either through an evolutionary process 9 or economic intuition, 10
can be squared with efficiency goals. Yet, antitrust law and the treatment
of monopoly power, which are expressly about economic matters, seem
to have resisted the same evolution. This appears counterintuitive since
antitrust policy is said to reflect the influence of the economically-ori-
ented Chicago School. In reality, since the adoption of the Chicago ap-
proach, the allocation of the right to monopoly power seems guided by
rules only marginally related to efficiency concerns, if even related at all.
Ironically, a more instrumental and economically consistent approach to
market power is found in older judicial opinions written when courts re-
acted more intuitively to market power issues and before courts adopted
a so-called more economically sophisticated methodology.
Finally, the presumptively legal approach is inconsistent with the "an-
cillary restraints" doctrine." This doctrine has become a key ingredient
in the economic approach to antitrust. Essentially, it permits two or more
firms to join and increase their market power only if that combination is a
necessary step in achieving procompetitive and consumer-benefiting
United States .. .in conferring [a copyright] lie[s] in the general benefits derived by the
public from the labors of authors.").
Similarly, according to the report of the Judiciary Committee of the House of Represen-
tative accompanying the 1909 revisions:
In enacting a copyright law Congress must consider.., two questions: First,
how much will the legislation stimulate the producer and so benefit the pub-
lic; and, second, how much will the monopoly granted be detrimental to the
public? The granting of such exclusive rights, under the proper terms and
conditions, confers a benefit upon the public that outweighs the evils of a
temporary monopoly.
Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 429 n.10 (citing H.R. Rep. No 2222, at 7 (1909)).
8. See generally Jeffrey L. Harrison, A Positive Externalities Approach to Copyright
Law: Theory and Application, 13 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1 (2005); William M. Landes & Rich-
ard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325 (1989).
9. Under this theory, inefficient rules are challenged more frequently. If changed to
efficient rules, they are less likely to be challenged. The net effect is a gradual process
toward the adoption of efficient rules. See generally George L. Priest, The Common Law
Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65 (1977); Paul H. Rubin,
Why Is the Common Law Efficient, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51 (1977).
10. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 252 (6th ed.
2003).
11. For a description of the doctrine, see infra notes 41-47 and accompanying text.
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ends.12 Yet, no such doctrine has emerged in the context of single-firm
behavior.
In general, the modem approach tends to frame its analysis in terms of
"why should market power be limited?" as opposed to the more appro-
priate question of "why should market power be tolerated?" In addition,
courts often evaluate market definition and market power issues with
normative values in mind. This is found in a tendency to distinguish "ac-
tionable" market power from market power that is not actionable. 13 This
is a political decision and not an economic one. From the standpoint of
economics and consumer welfare, market power has the same welfare-
reducing impact regardless of its source. Two threads, in particular, have
emerged. One thread is that market power arising from market imperfec-
tions-windfall market power-is not to be dealt with by antitrust law. 14
The other thread is that market power resulting from buyer decision-
making that advances the market power of the sellers is not actionable
market power. These can be referred to as "circumstantial" 15 and "con-
sensual"' 6 market power, respectively.
The lack of recognition of an instrumental approach to market power is
unfortunate given that one of the more remarkable developments in the
interpretation of the antitrust laws over the last forty years has been the
changing treatment of market power. The elimination and softening of
per se rules over the last thirty years mean that the evaluation of market
power has become more critical. 17 Specifically, in former years, certain
practices were unlawful without assessing whether the firm or firms pos-
sessed market power. Now, with the exception of claims of horizontal
minimum price-fixing territorial divisions and some boycotts, every anti-
trust plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant possesses market
power. 18 It has become the threshold substantive issue in virtually every
12. See Martin B. Louis, Restraints Ancillary to Joint Ventures and Licensing Agree-
ments: Do Sealy and Topco Logically Survive Sylvania and Broadcast Music?, 66 VA. L.
REV. 879, 882 (1980).
13. It is important to note that the possession of market power alone is not an antitrust
violation. Instead, the question is how that market power is used. The most important
statement of this proposition is found in United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d
416, 429-30 (2d Cir. 1945).
14. Jefferson Parish Hospital v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
15. See infra notes 163-68 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 169-70 and accompanying text.
17. The principle change has been the demise of the so-called per se rules. Under a per
se rule, certain practices violated section 1 or 2 of the Sherman Act or section 3 of the
Clayton Act without an analysis of whether the firms or firms involved possessed market
power. These per se rules applied to horizontal and vertical maximum and minimum price-
fixing, boycotts, tying, and horizontal market divisions. Now all of these practices, aside
from horizontal agreements on minimum prices, are subject to some level of market power
analysis before they are found to be violations. See E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & JEFFREY L.
HARRISON, UNDERSTANDING ANTITRUST AND ITS ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS 129-36 (4th
ed. 2003).
18. The most important decision establishing this is Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Syl-
vania, 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
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antitrust case.19 This threshold issue could then lead to an analysis of the
economic utility of that allocation of market power-an instrumental ap-
proach-similar to the analysis that implicitly underlies the assignment of
intellectual property rights.
This Article is devoted to developing the themes described above. Sec-
tion II further discusses what an instrumental approach to market power
would look like and compares that approach to the current approach to
market power. An instrumental approach has two necessary elements.
First, it recognizes, as economics does, the similarity of all types of market
power regardless of the source. Second, it permits the possession of mo-
nopoly power by private entities only when that power is linked to buyer-
benefiting effects. The analysis distinguishes between market power as-
signments that are socially useful and those that are not. The fundamen-
tal idea is that market power should be allocated, like a property right, to
those firms whose activities increase consumer welfare by virtue of pos-
sessing that power. More importantly, the default position would pro-
hibit concentrations of market power unless that concentration is a
necessary step to enhancing consumer welfare.
An additional benefit of an instrumental approach is procedural in na-
ture. An instrumental approach would require those possessing market
power to demonstrate the consumer-benefiting effects resulting from pos-
session of that power. Thus, the burden of proof as to those effects would
be allocated to the party who is in the best economic position to and
quantify those effects. Consequently, litigation costs would be reduced.
Sections III and IV are devoted to an examination of whether the in-
strumental approach has been applied by the courts. Section III discusses
key cases in which outcomes are consistent with, if not explained by, an
instrumental approach. This ambiguity-consistent with as opposed to
explained by-is standard in this type of analysis because economic intui-
tion is not easily identified from the language a court uses. As already
noted, the principal cases in which this appears to be true predate the
courts' mid-1970s adoption of the economic approach. It does, however,
show up from time to time in more recent cases. Section IV focuses on
the development of the non-instrumental approach.
Section V is a survey of how lower courts have responded to Supreme
Court guidance on this issue. Ultimately, the question is how the treat-
ment of market power by the courts can be squared with maximizing so-
cial welfare. More specifically, have the last forty years drawn us any
closer to a systematic treatment of monopoly that is consistent with the-
ory? Again, this is not something that can be determined by examining
only what courts say. Instead, it requires a more nuanced and contextual
evaluation of judicial reactions to market power. In fact, the narrow eco-
nomic approach fostered over the last forty years may have taken us
away from a social welfare-maximizing policy. An examination of key




antitrust decisions reveals that opinions most disfavored by those promot-
ing an economic approach are actually the most consistent with the goal
of maximizing social welfare.
Finally, in Section VI, an effort is made to determine what lies beneath
the drift of monopoly power and market power analysis away from an
instrumental approach. Ultimately, the answer is that antitrust law, de-
spite a so-called economic approach, is guided by the political leanings of
those making the decisions. The prevailing political leaning is one that
protects the status quo distribution of wealth and income and avoids gov-
ernment intervention regardless of the cost society must bear.
II. AN INSTRUMENTAL APPROACH TO MARKET POWER
The rationale for the instrumental approach to antitrust law follows
from an understanding of the welfare effects of monopoly. This is cov-
ered in any introductory microeconomic textbook,20 but the explanation
can be scaled down to a few basic ideas. The usual presentation is one
that compares the output and price in an industry that is monopolized
and one that operates under competitive conditions. Competitive condi-
tions require that individual firms respond to the competitive threats of
other firms, which pushes prices down. Quantity demanded increases at
lower prices and this also results in higher levels of output. Under mo-
nopoly conditions, the lack of competition means that prices are higher
and output is lower.2 1 The ability to restrict output in the entire market is
a necessary condition of the successful use of monopoly power.22
The impact on price and output leads to welfare implications. There
are two components to consider. An example will be useful. First, sup-
pose that under competition, output is 1000 units, and under monopoly,
output is 800 units. Some of the units-800-sold under competitive con-
ditions are sold under monopoly conditions also but at a higher price.
This higher price represents a transfer from consumers to the monopo-
list.23 Because of the problem of interpersonal comparisons of utility, it is
not possible to say whether this change is a net social loss or even a net
gain.24 Second, the restriction of output-from 1000 to 800-means that
units of output that would have been sold and which would have led to
20. See, e.g., PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORHAUS, ECONOMICS 158-61 (15th
ed. 1995). For more advanced reading, see DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF,
MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 87-98 (3d ed. 2000).
21. Most demand curves are said to be downward-sloping, meaning that at higher
prices a lower quantity of output is demanded.
22. Of course, any firm is free to raise prices. The key is to raise them and to profitably
keep them higher. This is the measure of market or monopoly power.
23. Consumer surplus is a measure of the benefit to the consumer of buying a unit of
output. It is the difference between the price charged and the highest price the consumer
would have been willing to pay. By charging higher prices, the monopolist decreases con-
sumer surplus.
24. This involves the impossible task of comparing the utility lost by consumers to that
gained by those benefiting from higher prices. This does not mean that one cannot make a
noneconomic assessment, and much of public policy about price is based on these
assessments.
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higher consumer welfare and social welfare will be withheld from the
market. Under competitive conditions, these units would have been pro-
duced as long as the value attributed to these units exceeded the cost of
the resources consumed in their production.25 Under monopoly condi-
tions, they will not be produced even though consumers attribute greater
value to the output than to the cost of the resources consumed in produc-
tion.26 This is a true loss-sometimes called a "welfare loss" or "dead-
weight loss"-since it is not a transfer from consumers to producers but
an elimination of production that added to consumer welfare. Since the
costs to buyers exceed the gains to the monopoly-seller, the overall im-
pact is a net social loss.
There seems to be little dispute in law or economics about the basic
monopoly model and the social cost of monopoly.27 Legitimate questions
arise, though, with respect to whether monopoly power is actually a nec-
essary evil in order to obtain benefits that would not be obtainable under
competitive conditions. For example, a standard line of reasoning holds
that the lure of monopoly profits is a necessary condition for innovation.
Innovation typically means assuming some level of risk. The outcome is
calculated in terms of expected returns, in which probability plays a role.
For example, an innovative effort with an equal probability of success and
failure means that there is a fifty percent chance of incurring losses and a
fifty percent chance of earning a profit. If these profits are not permitted
to be high enough to offset the losses in order to make the effort, on
balance, attractive, the effort will not occur.
Possibly the most compelling argument for the necessity of monopoly is
really not a justification for monopoly but a justification for large levels
of volume. In some industries, firms must operate at relatively large
scales to take advantage of economies of scale.28 Economies of scale
mean lower costs of production and lower consumption of resources to
produce any particular level of output. Demand in a particular market
may only be great enough to support one or a few firms operating effi-
ciently.29 In these instances, market power may be a necessary conse-
quence of achieving what is called "productive efficiency."
25. It is standard textbook theory that units sold by a monopolist at a higher price than
would exist under competitive conditions does not involve welfare loss. This is because the
higher price is redistributed from consumers to producers. Whether this redistribution
means an increase or decrease in overall welfare when balanced out is impossible to
determine.
26. The value of resources is determined by the prices established in their respective
markets. The parties interacting in these markets compete to employ the resources in the
production of different types of output. In effect, the cost paid to draw a resource into a
particular market reflects what it costs to "outbid" those wishing to use the resources in
another market. Thus, the cost of production is a direct reflection of the value of the input
in the production of other goods or services.
27. There are, however, disagreements on the level of harm.
28. For a discussion of economies as a defense in cases involving mergers that result in
increases in market power, see generally Oliver Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust
Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 AM. ECON, REV. 18, 19 (1968).
29. When the demand in a market can be most efficiently served by one firm, that firm
is a "natural monopoly." In some instances, the demand can be met by a few firms operat-
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A final instance in which the overall benefits of monopoly power may
be positive involves network effects. 30 In these cases, the product itself
delivers greater utility as the number of purchasers increases. For exam-
ple, years ago, owning a fax machine was relatively useless. As more peo-
ple owned fax machines, each individual fax machine became more useful
and more valuable. Of course, more recently, the importance of network
effects has been discussed in the context of operating systems, computer
software, and communications systems more generally. 31 In these in-
stances, the product itself delivers greater consumer surplus the greater
the market share of the producer.
These three sources of efficiency do not eliminate the "deadweight"
loss of monopoly, but they may outweigh it. In addition, it is important to
recognize another-although possibly obvious-element of the analysis.
The instrumental approach does not view market power and the source of
consumer welfare separately. In other words, a firm may have market
power and be able to deliver on innovation, productive efficiency, or net-
work effects. The critical question, however, is whether market power is
a necessary condition for the production of those benefits. Innovation,
productive efficiency, and network effects are possible, at one level or
another, without high levels of market dominance. Thus, under an instru-
mental approach, monopoly is permitted when those benefits are other-
wise unavailable.
What this suggests is that there is no economic reason to tolerate mo-
nopoly power unless those possessing it are able to deliver in one or more
of these three ways. At the most basic level, the benefits of monopoly
should exceed its costs. Put differently, the "right" to operate as a mo-
nopolist should be granted only as long as the benefits exceed the costs.
This outcome is consistent with a market solution with respect to the pos-
session of market power. Specifically, consider a "global auction" for the
right to operate as a monopolist.32 This right might be possessed by a
seller or sellers and used to charge monopoly prices, or by buyers to pre-
vent that use. A producer would bid an amount equal to the consumer
surplus captured through the use of monopoly power. Consumers, how-
ever, would consistently bid more for this right because the elimination of
market power is worth not only the consumer surplus that is captured by
the monopolist but the sum of that consumer surplus and the deadweight
loss associated with the units the monopolist does not produce. From a
Coasian perspective, in a transaction-cost-free environment, the right
ing efficiently. Each firm is not a natural monopolist, but each may possess some level of
market power.
30. See generally JEAN TIROLE, THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 404-06 (1988).
31. Joseph Farrell & Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open Ac-
cess: Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet Age, 17 HARV. J.L.
& TECH. 85, 119 (2003); Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Net-
work Effects, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 93, 100-05 (1994).
32. A "global auction" is a theoretical construct in which all parties affected are per-
mitted to bid and free riding is impossible.
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would be consistently purchased by buyers. 33 In other words, in a trans-
action-cost-free world, monopoly power would not exist unless associated
with innovation, productive efficiency, or network effects. The monopoly
right-meaning the right of sellers to use monopoly power or the right of
consumers to be free of monopoly power-would be assigned to consum-
ers in the form of the right to be free of monopoly power. The current
approach, by virtue of adopting the position that monopoly power is pre-
sumptively legal, has the effect of attributing to transaction costs either
positive economic or moral significance in and of themselves. Otherwise,
why allow them to be determinative of the allocation of the right?
The only circumstances under which "no monopoly" would not be the
efficient allocation and under which consumers would not outbid produc-
ers would be instances in which consumers receive benefits by virtue of
monopolists. In this "global auction," consumers would lower their bids
to the extent they were beneficiaries of innovation, productive efficiency,
or network effects. If the bids were lowered by enough to offset the wel-
fare loss of monopoly, the monopolist would outbid consumers for the
right to operate as a monopoly.34 For example, lower prices made possi-
ble by large-scale production can be a source of consumer surplus. That
surplus may offset the welfare loss. 35 In effect, monopoly power is toler-
ated as long as the benefits exceed the costs. Similarly, network effects
will make goods more attractive and result in greater consumer surplus.
Again, this increase may outstrip the welfare loss due to monopoly. 36
This cost/benefit analysis of monopoly rights is complicated by two fac-
tors. The costs of monopoly include not simply the welfare loss associ-
ated with reductions in output, but also expenditures on efforts to achieve
or maintain monopoly power. These expenditures are ultimately only fo-
cused on redistributions from buyers to sellers and create no new
wealth. 37
The second complicating factor is the cost of a system that reacts to
monopoly in a manner designed to maximize social welfare. An enforce-
ment system devoted to finding and eliminating all forms of monopoly
power may be more costly than the net benefits of making markets more
competitive. It is important to note, however, that the net effect of
adopting an instrumental approach may not be as large as one might ini-
tially expect. An instrumental approach would shift to those in the best
(lower cost) position to know what economic benefits flow from that
33. This follows from the basic proposition that in a transactions-cost-free environ-
ment, resources would end up in the possession of those attributing the greatest value to
them. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1, 3 (1960).
34. Opposers of monopolists would lower their bids if they enjoyed the benefits of
monopoly power.
35. It does not eliminate the welfare loss.
36. Both of these possibilities can be demonstrated graphically and mathematically. In
all cases, the outcome will be that consumer surplus is increased, either by lower prices or
offering a more attractive product that increases demand.
37. See Richard A. Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. POL.
ECON. 807, 817-18 (1975).
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power, those holding monopoly power. In addition, the need to offset the
costs of monopoly pricing with buyer benefits may result in a greater will-
ingness to pass on to buyers lower costs of production resulting from
economies of scale and a greater incentive to invest in activities that gen-
erate other offsetting consumer benefits.
It is possible, then, to express the "efficient" monopoly under an instru-
mental approach as existing when: Bm + Ce > Mc + W1, where Bm is the
benefit that is only available if a firm possesses monopoly power, Ce is
net enforcement cost, W1 is the welfare loss associated with the monop-
oly, and Mc is the cost of efforts designed to achieve monopoly power for
redistribution purposes. In other words, if the sum of the benefits and
enforcement cost avoided exceed the welfare loss and distribution-affect-
ing expenditures, it makes economic sense to allow the monopoly to op-
erate. More importantly, as the expression implies, it is possible for Bm
to be zero but for the "benefits" of monopoly to exceed its costs. The
only benefits in this instance would be the enforcement costs avoided. In
these cases, a harmful monopoly is only tolerated because its elimination
is more expensive than the welfare gain.
Although the theory underlying intellectual property is hardly put into
practice on a consistent basis,38 it is interesting to note how much more
sensitive that theory is to the economic considerations discussed above,
and how much more consistent the theory is with an instrumental ap-
proach rather than modern antitrust. Four factors, in particular, that are
critical to an economically rational system of intellectual property law are
missing when it comes to antitrust. First, at least the theory of intellectual
property law requires recognizing costs and benefits. More specifically,
exclusivity is a means to an end.3 9 Second, this exclusivity is limited be-
cause at some point the benefits are outweighed by the cost. Third, in
intellectual property law but not in antitrust law, there is a clear recogni-
tion that market power is, in effect, a type of property. Fourth, and most
striking, a great deal of intellectual property law is devoted to who owns
the right to the market power, or at least the exclusivity, that may follow
from the assignment of exclusive rights. 40 In effect, ownership is an in-
strument for increasing social welfare more generally. If anything, the
goals of antitrust should be even more closely aligned with the goal of
maximizing efficiency and consumer welfare than intellectual property
law. The allocation of the ownership of market power is perhaps the
most important method of advancing this goal.
What becomes clear, as suggested earlier, is that monopoly power is
like an asset to be possessed by those who are able to provide a net bene-
fit to society when they hold it. Although obviously not the same as intel-
lectual property, the similarity is clear when one thinks of monopoly
38. See generally Harrison, supra note 8.
39. See generally Landes & Posner, supra note 8.
40. See generally MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 291-93 (4th
ed. 2005).
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power as a form of exclusivity. Unlike intellectual property, in which
there is some demonstration of uniqueness, novelty, or usefulness before
the right is bestowed, the more general monopolist does not need to meet
any similar test. In fact, non-intellectual property monopolies can be the
result of anything ranging from ground-breaking innovation to dumb
luck. A good example is the indifference of courts to what has been la-
beled "circumstantial market power," made possible by imperfect infor-
mation and the slow response of the market to price changes. Yet,
circumstantial market power is market power and can cause the same
market distortion as the most aggressively acquired market power. In
addition, unlike intellectual property monopolies, these other monopo-
lists exist without a time limit. They can exist far longer than necessary to
bring forth the innovative effort.
An instrumental approach to market power may seem radical to many,
but it should not to those who have some understanding of antitrust. This
is because an instrumental approach to monopoly power is very similar to
the ancillary restraints doctrine, both in its original form and in its more
recently revived form. When the antitrust laws were first interpreted, a
problem emerged with respect to the broad language of section 2 of the
Sherman Act prohibiting any restraints of trade. Taken literally, section 1
of the Sherman Act could have meant banning a number of traditionally
legal relationships, including forming a simple business partnership.
To avoid an obvious overextension of the Sherman Act, the notion of
"ancillary restraints" was developed, under which restraints that were no
more extensive than necessary and ancillary to an otherwise lawful agree-
ment were held to violate the Sherman Act.41 The development of the
"rule of reason" under which all restraints were assessed by comparing
the procompetitive and anticompetitive effects made the ancillary re-
straints approach unnecessary.42 The doctrine experienced a rebirth in
the 1970s as courts looked for a means of avoiding the over-inclusiveness
of per se rules. The best known modern application is Broadcast Music,
Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, in which the Court found that de-
fendants were literally engaged in price-fixing but found that the restraint
was necessary in order to market a blanket license for musical composi-
tions.43 Similarly, in Polk Brothers Inc. v. Forest City, competitors agreed
to horizontally divide a market-normally a per se offense-but the per
se standard was not applied.44 The joint effort of the defendants resulted
in the commercial development of a shopping area that may not have
developed at all had they faced competition from each other.45 In other
41. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 282 (6th Cir. 1898), affd
175 U.S. 211 (1899). See generally Jeffrey L. Harrison, Price Fixing, the Professions, and
Ancillary Restraints: Coping with Maricopa County, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 925 (1982); Louis,
supra note 12.
42. Harrison, supra note 41, at 932.
43. Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979). The Court
noted that "literal price fixing" was not necessarily in the per se category. Id. at 7.
44. Polk Bros. Inc. v. Forest City, 776 F.2d 185, 185, 190 (7th Cir. 1985).
45. Id. at 190.
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words, the agreement not to compete was ancillary to a procompetitive
venture.
In effect, the ancillary restraints doctrine developed from the recogni-
tion that anticompetitive influences may be a necessary cost of bringing
forth broader social-welfare-increasing efforts. In these types of cases,
the combination of firms results in an increase in market power, but the
increase is for limited use. The aggregation of power is recognized as a
means to the end of maximizing social welfare. 46 In effect, courts have
already developed an instrumental approach to section 1 of the Sherman
Act as it relates to horizontal agreements. 47 In the context of single-firm
market power issues and as already suggested, the instrumental approach
permits power as long as there is no less restrictive way to achieve inno-
vation, productive efficiency, or network effects. Thus, the instrumental
approach to market power is no more than an extension of the ancillary
restraints doctrine to individual firms. More importantly, as described in
the analysis that follows, many of the early judicial responses to market
power reflect the ancillary restraints doctrine.
The absence of an ancillary restraints approach to individual firms
raises questions about the actual philosophy of some of those claiming to
apply economics to antitrust. The overall impact of the doctrine when
applied to two or more firms is to lower the level of antitrust enforcement
and the participation of public enforcement agencies in regulating the
competitive process. When applied to single-firm behavior, however, the
implications change. The focus is not on when to permit accumulated
market power but when that power is necessary to achieve socially benefi-
cial ends. This means higher levels of scrutiny and greater levels of en-
forcement. Thus, for those whose principal attraction to an economic
approach is that it can be used as a tool to support a policy of limited
enforcement, application of the ancillary restraints doctrine to single
firms can be worrisome.
In the process of this analysis, it is important not to confuse firm scale
or size with market power. The instrumental approach permits market
power when the power itself is the key to buyer-benefiting activity. Large
firms may be able to offer innovation, productive efficiencies, and net-
work effects, but unless it is tied to market power, the possession of
power is not the least anticompetitive method of achieving those ends.
The clearest articulation of this is found in United States Steel Corp. v.
Fortner Enterprises, Inc., a tying case in which U.S. Steel made attractive
loan terms available to those who purchased prefabricated homes from
one of its subsidiaries. 48 The loans were regarded as the tying "prod-
uct."'49 The Court found that the ability to make attractive loans was not
46. See Harrison, supra note 41, at 931.
47. Except for setting minimum resale prices, vertical restraints are assessed under the
rule of reason.
48. United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., Inc., 429 U.S. 610, 620 (1977).
49. Id. at 610.
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a function of market power. 50 Instead, any large firm willing to accept
the risks could make comparable terms available without regard to mar-
ket power.51 Similarly, a firm wishing to maintain its power under the
instrumental approach would have to draw a direct connection between
its market power and the ability to offer innovation, productive effi-
ciency, or network effects.
It may be easiest to comprehend the nature of an instrumental ap-
proach by looking at how courts generally address market power issues
today. In the context of an actual monopolization or attempt to monopo-
lize claim under section 2 of the Sherman Act, the default position ac-
cepts monopoly power without regard to whether it is associated with
innovation, productive efficiency, or network effects.5 2 The only limita-
tion is that this power may not be used to increase or maintain power by
the use of predatory means.53 In this context, "predatory" is the use of
measures that are irrational from a profit-maximizing standpoint unless
they lead to an increase or maintenance of market power.54 Other uses
of market power-whether involving tying or combinations of competi-
tors-are permitted unless used to the detriment of competitors without
offsetting gains to consumers.
The most striking difference between the two approaches is the accept-
ance of the status quo allocation of market power regardless of its origins.
If one accepts the view of market power as an income-earning asset, the
current approach is one that views even the most random distribution of
the property interest as consistent with maximizing social welfare. There
is no evidence in the context of conventional property law that initial
allocations are the most efficient. In the context of market power, it may
be more likely that initial allocations are consistent with efficiency, but it
is an empirical question that the instrumental approach seeks to answer. 55
This suggests one more extension of the analogy of monopoly power to
conventional property. An owner's use of property that makes other par-
ties worse off gives rise to government regulation or indirect regulation
through private legal actions that force the property owner to curtail or
internalize the costs of externalities. It is difficult to distinguish the use of
market power that benefits its owners only by imposing losses on others
from the use of any other asset or property that imposes costs-external-
ities-on others.5 6
50. Id. at 617.
51. Id. at 622.
52. See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 602-05
(1985).
53. See id. at 605.
54. See id.
55. At least some market power is the consequence of innovation, thus taking it out of
the realm of more random property allocations.
56. An externalities approach to market power is also consistent with the solution to
externalities that would occur in a transaction-cost-free market.
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III. INSTRUMENTAL MARKET POWER IN THE COURTS
As suggested at the outset, the Supreme Court and lower courts have,
from time to time, reached outcomes and used rationales that reflect on
instrumental approach. This is consistent with a belief of some that the
law tends to move toward efficient outcomes.57 In fact, one would expect
antitrust, if anything, to be more affected by an intuitive economic ap-
proach than other areas of law. This analysis begins with United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America ("Alcoa") 58 and other early Supreme Court
decisions. It also includes two subsequent decisions-Aspen Skiing Co. v.
Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.59 and Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech-
nical Services6 0-that are viewed by some as inconsistent with sound eco-
nomic reasoning.61
In Alcoa, Judge Hand determined that the company possessed a ninety
percent market share in the relevant market of virgin aluminum ingot.62
The question he then considered was what the appropriate response
should be. 63 His reasoning reflects ambivalence. In discussing Alcoa's
position, he writes,
[h]aving proved that 'Alcoa' had a monopoly of the domestic ingot
market, the plaintiff had gone far enough; if it was an excuse, that
'Alcoa' had not abused its power, it lay upon Alcoa to prove that it
had not. But the whole issue is irrelevant anyway, for it is no excuse
for 'monopolizing' a market that the monopoly has not been used to
extract from the consumer more than a 'fair' profit. 64
Judge Hand went on to describe a number of advantages of industries
composed of a number of small producers.65
Then, in what reads as an about-face, he continues: "It does not follow
because 'Alcoa' had [monopoly power], that it 'monopolized' .. ..-66
Thus, monopoly itself was not a violation of the antitrust laws. 67 This
57. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
58. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
59. 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
60. 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
61. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago Antitrust: A Review and Critique,
2001 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 257, 283-99; Glen 0. Robinson, On Refusing to Deal with Ri-
vals, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1177, 1194-204 (2002).
62. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 423. This determination itself has been the subject of significant
discussion. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 173-74 (1978); HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRAC-
TICE 107-10 (3d ed. 2005); LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF
ANTITRUST 63-64 (2000); SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 17, at 33-34; .
63. For a more detailed discussion of the facts of Alcoa, see LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN
& WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 100-02 (2d
ed. 2005).
64. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 427. See generally Alfred E. Kahn, Standards for Antitrust Pol-
icy, 67 HARV. L. REV. 28 (1953); Oliver Williamson, Dominant Firms and Monopoly Prob-
lem: Market Failure Considerations, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1512 (1972).
65. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 427.
66. Id. at 429.
67. Id.
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power may have been "thrust upon" a firm68 by virtue of "superior skill,
foresight and industry, ' 69 or natural monopoly. 70 In effect, not all mo-
nopolies were unlawful. According to Judge Hand, "the Act does not
mean to condemn the resultant of those very forces which it is its prime
objective to foster[.]" 71
Clearly Judge Hand was motivated by what some regard as
noneconomic values advanced by a greater dispersion of economic
power.72 Still, the decision comes very close to tracking an economically
rational approach to monopoly. More specifically, the economically cor-
rect position is taken that monopoly power is to be disfavored unless
there are countervailing circumstances. Two of the possibilities noted by
Judge Hand fit nicely with the instrumental approach. Obviously, "skill,
foresight and industry" are rewards for innovation, and natural monopoly
is consistent with productive efficiency. Whether Judge Hand's notion of
"thrust upon" allows for other types of monopoly is not clear, but his
opinion gives the impression that he deeply distrusted monopolies and
felt that they were, at best, necessary evils.
Ultimately, Judge Hand's reaction to Alcoa's practice of maintaining
excess capacity in order to meet new demand as it emerged probably tells
us more than his words.73 Judge Hand's view that maintaining excess ca-
pacity crossed the line in terms of acceptable conduct is arguably a pre-
tense enabling him to react to Alcoa's monopoly status. Specifically, the
willingness to maintain excess capacity in hopes of serving increased de-
mand may retard entry by competitors, but it can also be seen as risk-
taking that is beneficial to buyers and consistent in some respects with
"skill, foresight and industry." By analogy to the ancillary restraints doc-
trine, however, whatever benefits Alcoa offered in terms of any innova-
tion, productive efficiency, or network effects were available without
Alcoa's market power. 74 In short, from the standpoint of consumer wel-
fare, there was no reason to legitimize Alcoa's monopoly position. Judge
Hand's treatment of Alcoa, therefore, is consistent with an instrumental
approach because it can be squared with the view that monopoly is to be
avoided unless it is a necessary condition for consumer-benefiting con-
duct. Under today's "presumptively legal" standard for monopoly, how-
ever, Alcoa would not be found to have violated Section 2 of the
Sherman Act. 75
68. Id.
69. Id. at 430.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 429.
73. Id. at 431.
74. By 1950, the aluminum industry had become more competitive at all levels, leading
to a decision not to order divestiture. See UNITED STATES V. ALUMINUM CO. OF AM., 91 F.
Supp. 333, 416 (S.D.N.Y., 1950).
75. It is, perhaps, useful to reflect on Alcoa in the context of the reasoning that the
holding in Fortner discussed earlier. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text. Fortner
involved a tying claim. United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., Inc., 429 U.S. 610, 611
(1977). The tying product was favorable credit terms, and the tied product was prefabri-
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United States v. Griffith represents another case in which an intuitive
instrumental approach was employed. 76 There, the Supreme Court ex-
amined a practice in which theater chains that owned the only theaters in
some towns would use that leverage against film distributors in order to
obtain exclusive bookings in the towns where theater owners faced com-
petition.77 The monopolies in this instance were individual movie thea-
ters located in towns in which there were no competing theaters. 78
Within the space of a paragraph, Justice Douglas wrote, "monopoly
power, whether lawfully or unlawfully acquired, may itself constitute an
evil and stand condemned under [section 2 of the Sherman Act] even
though it remains unexercised. ' 79 Later, however, Justice Douglas found
the distinction that Judge Hand found, "the existence of power 'to ex-
clude competition when it is desired to do so' is itself a violation of [sec-
tion] 2, provided it is coupled with the purpose or intent to exercise that
power." °80 A more modern "presumptively legal" analysis would question
whether ownership of a single theater actually resulted in market power.
In addition, under a modern analysis, the exclusivity agreements can be
seen as actually procompetitive and squared with the avoidance of free-
riding.8 ' Thus, the practice might well be declared lawful. The instru-
mental approach, on the other hand, focuses on whether there is any so-
cially beneficial reason-innovation, productive efficiency, or network
effects-to allow one theater chain to enjoy an advantage over another
simply by virtue of the geographic location of theaters. Justice Douglas
answered that there is not.82
A final example 83 of an intuitive instrumental approach in the pre-Chi-
cago era-selected because it is regarded by some as the improper exten-
cated homes. Id. The Supreme Court made clear that a tying claim required proof of
market power as traditionally defined; the defendant in Fortner, although potentially a
huge lender, simply did not possess market power in that market. Id. at 617. See generally
SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 17, at 256-58.
76. United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948).
77. Id. at 101-04. It may be more accurate to view Griffith as a case involving monop-
sony or power on the buying side of the market. In the single-theater towns, film distribu-
tors faced a single buyer. That monopsony power was used to exact favorable terms in
towns in which there were competing buyers.
78. Id. at 102, 106.
79. Id. at 107.
80. Id. (citing American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 811 (1911)).
81. Specifically, unless given exclusive rights in towns in which there are competitors,
theaters promoting a movie would find that some of the benefit would accrue to competing
theaters.
82. At this point in the development of antitrust standards, there was still some uncer-
tainty when it came to section 2 of the Sherman Act. The standard finally expressed by
Judge Douglas in United States v. Grinnell remains the most helpful: "[t]he offense of mo-
nopoly under s 2 of the Sherman Act has two elements: (1) the possession of monopoly
power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power
as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, busi-
ness acumen, or historic accident." United States v. Grinnell, 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966),
affd except as to decree, 385 U.S. 563 (1966).
83. Other examples among the pre-Chicago cases studied in most antitrust classes in-
clude Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962), and United States v. United
Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), affd per curium, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
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sion of tying analysis 4-is Northwest Pacific Railway Co. v. United
States.8 5 The railroad had benefited from grants of land on which to con-
struct its rails.8 6 The grants included land on either side of the rail bed
that the railroad sold or leased to others under the condition that any
goods produced on the land would be transported on the railroad.8 7 The
land grants took place in 1864 and 1870.88 By 1949, most of the land had
been sold or leased, and there were alternative rail lines available to the
buyers and lessees.89 The tying arrangement was challenged and found to
violate section 1 of the Sherman Act.90 Unlike today's standards for ty-
ing arrangements, the requirement for market power in the tying product
market was not a major focus of the Court.91 Instead, according to the
Court, tying agreements "are unreasonable in and of themselves when-
ever a party has sufficient economic power with respect to the tying prod-
uct to appreciably restrain free competition in the market for the tied
product .... "92
The intuitive economic appeal of the Court's instrumental approach is
evident. After eighty years of control over the land and the presence of
competing railroads, there was hardly any basis connected to innovation,
productive efficiency, or network effects to allow the exploitation of
whatever market power it continued to have. Again, this can be com-
pared to the so-called more sophisticated analysis employed today. There
is every reason to believe that an antitrust court today would be per-
suaded by arguments that the defendant did not possess market power,
was not engaged in "forcing," and ultimately was simply engaged in price
discrimination in that the varying carriage charge was actually part of the
sales charge or rental fee for the land. Each of these claims would be
empirical questions, but only the last is possibly connected to social wel-
fare issues.
Clearly, it is easier to find instances of an intuitive instrumental ap-
proach in pre-Chicago cases. In fact, the intuitive economics of these
cases is in many respects superior than that found since the express adop-
tion of economic principles. Nevertheless, two relatively recent Supreme
Court cases are also indicative of that perspective. The first of these cases
is Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.93 There, the defen-
dant, Aspen Ski Co. ("Ski Co."), operated ski facilities at three moun-
tains and cooperated with Highlands in order to offer an all-area pass
84. See, e.g., F. Jay Cummings & Wayne E. Ruhter, The Northern Pacific Case, 22 J.L.
& ECON. 329, 329 (1979); Denise L. Diaz & Robert A. Skitol, Vertical Law Reform: Fertile
Ground for a New Antitrust Modernization Commission, 18 ANTITRUST 60, 61-63 (2003).
85. 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
86. Id. at 7.
87. Id. at 2; Christopher R. Leslie, Cutting Through Tying Theory with Occam's Razor:
A Simple Explanation of Tying Arrangements, 78 TUL. L. REV. 727, 782-84 (2004).
88. N. Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. at 2.
89. Id. at 7.
90. Id. at 7-8.
91. See id.
92. Id. at 6.
93. 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
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that permitted skiers to choose from among the mountains. 94 Eventually,
it discontinued the all-Aspen ticket and Highlands sued, claiming that the
refusal to continue the all-Aspen pass violated Section 2 of the Sherman
Act.95 The inability of Highlands to sell passes in conjunction with Ski
Co. put it at a severe competitive disadvantage. 96 The Court was faced
with the relatively novel question of whether the refusal to cooperate
could be regarded as monopolizing conduct. 97 It held that it could, basing
its opinion on the view that by discontinuing the all-Aspen pass, Ski Co.
had actually sought to advance its position in the market by selling a less
attractive ticket.98 In particular, the Court noted the predatory nature of
the decision by Ski Co. Quoting Judge Robert Bork, the Court reasoned
that, "[i]f a firm has been 'attempting to exclude rivals on some basis
other than efficiency' it is fair to characterize that conduct as preda-
tory." 99 In short, the defendant possessed market power, 100 and termina-
tion of the all-Aspen pass could not be squared with rewards to
innovation, productive efficiency, or network effects.101
Easily the most controversial recent case employing an instrumental
approach to market power is Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Ser-
vices.10 2 This case also includes, in Justice Scalia's dissent, the most artic-
ulate expression of the non-instrumental approach'0 3 and the problems of
determining to which market power courts should respond.'0 4 The facts
of Kodak are critical to understanding the Court's analysis. Kodak manu-
factured and sold photocopying machines. 10 5 It also sold replacement
parts and service.10 6 At one point, the replacement parts could be pur-
chased by independent service organizations ("ISOs"), enabling them to
compete with Kodak in offering repair services.10 7 Parts for Kodak were
not compatible with parts from other machines, which meant that to com-
pete in selling Kodak machine repair services, it was necessary to have
access to Kodak parts.'0 8 Eventually, Kodak changed its policy of making
parts available to ISOs and began selling them exclusively to owners of
Kodak machines who repaired their own machines or used Kodak's re-
94. Id. at 585.
95. Id. at 586-88.
96. Id. at 589-95.
97. Id. at 585.
98. Id. at 604-07.
99. Id. at 605 (quoting BORK, supra note 62, at 138).
100. Those familiar with the case know that it is not at all clear that the defendant did
possess market power in a relevant market. This issue, however, was not reviewed by the
Court.
101. It would be a mistake to infer that the Court was philosophically inclined to adopt
an instrumental approach. This outcome was mainly the result of the narrow issue ad-
dressed by the Court on appeal.
102. 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
103. Id. at 486.
104. This is discussed below. See infra notes 123-32 and accompanying text.
105. Kodak, 504 U.S. at 455.
106. Id. at 457.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 456-57.
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pair services. 10 9 This led to a claim by ISOs that Kodak was tying the sale
of service to replacement parts. 110 In effect, in order to purchase Kodak
parts, machine owners would also have to buy Kodak services."' The
obvious impact was on the ISOs that were not permitted to obtain
parts.112
One well-established requirement of tying claims is that the defendant
possesses market power in the tying product market.' 13 In this case, the
tying product was replacement parts."a 4 Defendants argued they could
not possess market power in the tying product market because they did
not possess market power in the market for the sale of the photocopying
machines themselves."15 The logic of the argument was that any actions
taken that were detrimental to consumers in the market for replacement
parts would ultimately make the photocopiers less attractive. 116 In effect,
they would be more expensive than competing machines. 1 7 This form of
a "price" increase would not be possible in a market in which they did not
possess market power.1 18 Antitrust veterans recognize this as the "single
monopoly profit" theory."l 9
The narrow issue faced by the Court was whether a firm that did not
possess market power in the market for the original equipment could pos-
sess market power in an aftermarket for parts.120 More technically,
should summary judgment be entered against plaintiffs in tying cases in-
volving aftermarket parts when it is shown that the defendant did not
possess market power in the original equipment market? 21 Ultimately,
the Court held that summary judgment was inappropriate because it was
possible, under certain conditions, for a firm to possess power in the
aftermarket without possessing power in the market for the original
109. Id. at 455-59.
110. The plaintiffs alleged a violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. Id. at
459. Section 3 of the Clayton Act, which more directly addresses tying issues, was unavail-
able because it is expressed in terms of "goods, wares, and merchandise." With very lim-
ited exceptions, section 1 Sherman Act claims have been treated just as they are treated
under section 3 of the Clayton Act. In at least one instance, however, the Supreme Court
suggested that the reach of the Clayton Act may exceed the reach of the Sherman Act. See
Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 327 (1961).
111. Kodak, 504 U.S. 458.
112. Id.
113. See, e.g., United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., Inc., 429 U.S. 610, 620
(1977).
114. Kodak, 504 U.S. at 457.
115. Id. at 465-66.
116. Id.
117. See id.
118. Id. This is despite the fact that Kodak may have been viewed as having a monop-
oly market share in the "market."
119. See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 36 (1984)
(O'Connor, J., concurring). The theory is that a certain amount of monopoly power can
only be used to reap a certain level of monopoly profit. That profit may be obtained
through the price charged for the tying product or through a combination of prices on the
tied and tying products. It cannot, however, be increased.





The Court identified two sources of this power. For the purposes of
this article, the "source" issue is important. The Court found that one
source of this power was the cost to buyers of the original equipment of
engaging in life-cycle pricing. 123 In order to respond to the higher price
of the original equipment resulting from aftermarket activities, consum-
ers would have to engage in a complex and often impractical process of
determining the price of the equipment, including all expected future re-
pairs and maintenance. 124 If consumers could not engage in this life-cycle
price, then it was possible to profit from consumer-harming aftermarket
practices without affecting original equipment sales.125
The second source of power was switching costs. 126 In effect, one way
for consumers to react to changes in policy that make aftermarket
purchases more burdensome is to switch to different original equip-
ment. 127 This, however, according to the Court, could be a costly process
when compared to simply absorbing the additional aftermarket costs.1 28
This is the so-called "lock-in" effect. 2 9 Firms may successfully exert mar-
ket power leverage by virtue of the fact that it is too costly for consumers
to take actions to avoid the leverage.
There appears to be no serious debate that these two factors can lead
to the possession of market power if one sticks to the economist's defini-
tion. When it is costly to make life-cycle pricing decisions and costly to
switch once one has invested in the original equipment, it is possible for a
firm to raise prices above competitive levels and keep them there. In
effect, the cost of life-cycle pricing and switching can be compared to an-
ticipated supracompetitive pricing in the aftermarket. When those costs
exceed the expected supracompetitive pricing, they provide "shelter" for
aftermarket price increases. The important instrumental element of the
decision is that the Court opens the door to considerations of market
power resulting from market imperfections such as information cost.130
This "found" or "windfall"'131 power, in effect, according to the court is
not to be automatically allocated to the firm initially benefiting from that
happenstance. 132 Circumstantial power that cannot be connected to in-
novation, productive efficiency, or network effects cannot be employed
by those possessing it to enhance their position with respect to buyers.
122. Id. at 477-78.
123. Id. at 473-75.
124. Id.
125. See id. at 473-74.
126. Id. at 476.
127. Id. at 476-77.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 476.
130. For a discussion of tying in the post-Kodak era, see Alan J. Meese, Tying Meets the
New Institutional Economics: Farewell to the Chimera of Forcing, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 39-
44 (1997).
131. This is unlikely to be power that is "thrust upon" a firm as described by Judge
Hand. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 429 (2d Cir. 1945).
132. Kodak, 504 U.S. at 473-77.
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From a practical standpoint, the most critical element of the Court's
opinion is the question of whether a plaintiff must show that the defen-
dant made a unilateral change in policy with respect to aftermarket
sale.133 As an economic matter, such a bright-line test would not be de-
terminative of the existence of market power but, as will be illustrated, 34
as a legal matter, the question may be crucial. The majority's statement
on the matter comes in a footnote in response to an argument put forth
by Justice Scalia in dissent. 135 Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion includes
a hypothetical in which a manufacturer requires purchasers of equipment
to also agree at that time to buy parts or service for the lifetime of the
equipment. 36 He noted that firms without market power in the sale of
the equipment would not be subject to per se treatment because the tie
would be comparable to raising the price of the equipment. 137 He then
noted that "the only thing lacking" in the current case to make it compa-
rable to his hypothetical is that Kodak's policy was not "announced or
generally known."'1 38
The majority responded to this point by noting that the lack of evi-
dence that the policy was announced or generally known was "crucial.' 39
Precisely what "crucial" means is not clear. Does it mean necessary, or
simply "very important?" As will be discussed below, the majority's re-
sponse to Justice Scalia has become important in subsequent decisions.140
This is unfortunate, because the distinction between announced or not
announced is not necessarily meaningful. The relevant issue is the cost of
information about the future. The fact that a policy is known in advance
does not mean that life-cycle pricing becomes a low-cost and practical
option.
Ironically, even though a number of pre-Chicago antitrust decisions
can be squared with an intuitive instrumental approach to monopoly
power, those decisions also created the foundation of the anti-instrumen-
tal, presumptively legal, approach now favored by most courts. In this
respect, Judge Hand's observation that monopoly is to be distinguished
from "the active verb 'monopolize"' found in section 2 of the Sherman
Act is critical.141 This language clearly added a behavioral requirement
to a section 2 case. In reality, this behavioral element could have been
reconciled with an instrumental approach in that the behavior could have
been the exercise of any power by a firm that acquired its position by
means unrelated to innovation, productive efficiency, or network effects.
But this was not to be the case.
133. Id. at 477.
134. See infra Part V.
135. Kodak, 504 U.S. at 477 n.24.
136. Id. at 491 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 492.
139. Id. at 477 n.24.
140. See infra Part V.
141. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 429 (2d Cir. 1945).
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IV. NONINSTRUMENTALISM IN THE COURTS
Modern considerations of market power are marked by two deviations
from an instrumental approach. The most obvious deviation is that pos-
session of market power is presumptively legal.142 In addition, the
source of the power has become relevant. The most critical case reflect-
ing this view and carrying antitrust law away from an instrumental ap-
proach to market power is Jefferson Parish Hospital District Number 2 v.
Hyde, in which the Court examined the argument that a hospital was ty-
ing a specific group of anesthesiologists to the hospital's surgical ser-
vices. 143 In effect, a person electing to use the hospital surgical facilities
was required to use an anesthesiologist that was preselected by the hospi-
tal.144 With a market share of only thirty percent, 14 5 it was not at all clear
that Jefferson Parish Hospital possessed the market share necessary to
qualify for per se condemnation; that alone would have been enough to
explain a result in favor of the hospital.
Rather than take a relatively simple path to the outcome, however, the
Court engaged in an assessment of "types" of market power. 146 It noted
that whatever leverage the hospital had could not be associated with
"forcing"'1 47 patients to choose a particular anesthesiologist but was the
result of consumer indifference. 148 This indifference was at least in part
due to the inability of consumers to understand the technical information
necessary to make an informed choice about an anesthesiologist and the
presence of third-party payers who more or less sheltered consumers
from the costs of their decisions. 149 Within the shelter, the hospital could
raise prices or require certain choices without risking consumer defec-
tions. 150 The Jefferson Parish Court conceded that the presence of third-
party payers and the lack of information that would enable consumers to
evaluate the quality of care did give rise to "'market power' in some
abstract sense[.]' '3 51 It then concluded that "they do not generate the
kind of market power that justifies condemnation of tying." 152
The Court's analysis of this point missed the economic essence of what
was taking place. The fact that the market power was not a conventional
type does not mean it cannot and was not used to harm competition and
ultimately consumers. The focus on the "type" of power found in Jeffer-
son Parish suggests that the ownership of some kinds of market power
and the potential to exploit them somehow falls outside the scope of the
142. Id. at 429-30.
143. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 4-5 (1984).
144. Id. at 5-6.
145. Id. at 7.
146. Id. at 27-29.
147. In fact, Jefferson Parish is the case that added the "forcing" requirement to a tying
claim. See SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 17, at 259-60.
148. Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 26-27.
149. Id. at 27-28.
150. See id. at 30 n.49.
151. Id. at 27.
152. Id.
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antitrust laws. Yet this power is equally harmful to consumers and de-
tached from any innovation, productive efficiency, or network effect
justification.
It is important in this regard to understand that consumers were not
willingly ignorant or indifferent in a competitively meaningful sense. In
fact, all of them undoubtedly preferred the best possible anesthesiologist.
In addition, given that the charge for services might ultimately be re-
flected in higher insurance premiums, they were similarly as unlikely to
be indifferent to price. Market imperfections simply made it impractical
and expensive, relative to the benefit, to invest in the search for a more
favorable exchange. In terms of forcing, buyers "chose" the panel of an-
esthesiologists offered by the hospital because the cost of information
that would permit a different choice was prohibitive.
This is not, however, the same thing as saying that an investment in
providing information to patients would not be a rational exercise by
competing anesthesiologists. Competitors would find it in their interest
to make that investment on behalf of buyers if they could be assured of
making a sale to those consumers who preferred their services. The deci-
sion in Jefferson Parish to label some types of market power immune to
antitrust scrutiny was actually a decision to communicate to competitors
in advance that an investment designed to overcome these market imper-
fections would be irrational because the choice of anesthesiologists would
not be left to consumers in any case. The Court's market power analysis
as it pertains to indifference and information costs actually retarded mar-
ket developments to overcome those barriers.
The practice of linking the hospital to one group of providers raised the
costs to patients of identifying and choosing alternatives, and it also
raised the cost to alternative suppliers of appealing to customers. To be
sure, patients might not have been as aware as victims of more typical ties
that they were being forced into certain choices. But this was because the
forcing was a bit more subtle or passive and, quite possible as a result,
more insidious. It may be easier to grasp this point by thinking of a situa-
tion in which there is not a pre-selected group of anesthesiologists and all
of these in the market were permitted to appeal to potential customers.
The extent to which different choices would be made than the ones found
under the arrangement in Jefferson Parish is a measure of the impact of
the hospital's practice.153 If any policy by the hospital changed the out-
come in terms of anesthesiologists chosen, the impact on patients and
competition is clear.
The problem with this market power "typing" can be understood by
thinking about a lone hospital in a remote area. It possesses market
power, but that power too is attributed to market imperfections. That
hospital may exact a high price or limit the choices of patients. Under
Jefferson Parish, this would be an acceptable use of market power be-
153. This does not mean that the hospital would necessarily have sufficient market
power to violate prohibitions on tying, but that is a different question.
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cause patients were not "forced." Of course, they were not "forced" be-
cause alternative choices were foreclosed by geographic isolation. As an
economic matter, the indifference stemming from geographic isolation
cannot be distinguished from the informational isolation that also leads to
a limited number of choices.
An instrumental approach to Jefferson Parish is different in a number
of ways. In the assessment of market power, the source of the power
would be irrelevant. If there were power, the question is whether the
practice challenged could be connected to innovation, productive effi-
ciency, or network effects and whether market power is a necessary con-
dition for this practice to result in the alleged benefits. This does not
mean that Jefferson Parish would be decided differently. The opinion
identifies a number of ways in which exclusivity with respect to anesthesi-
ologists may be beneficial to patients. 154 In the absence of those bene-
fits, however, the fact that the market power involved was the result of
high search costs and third-party payers should not shelter the practice.
Quite possibly the most complete statement of the noninstrumental ap-
proach is found a few years later in Justice Scalia's dissent in Kodak.155
As a dissenting opinion it would not, in the normal course of things, be
that important. His comments deserve close attention because ultimately
he appears to be correct in arguing that the majority opinion in Kodak
departed from Jefferson Parish and because his view has influenced the
lower courts. Perhaps most important in the exchange between Justice
Scalia and the majority arises with respect to whether a practice is an-
nounced ahead of time.156
Justice Scalia offers three principle arguments for exempting some
sources of market power from antitrust scrutiny. Even beginning with
the suggestion that some forms of monopoly fall outside the ambit of the
antitrust law represents a departure from the instrumental approach.
First, Justice Scalia characterizes the majority's reasoning with respect to
life-cycle pricing as describing "the occasional irrational consumers."'1 57
This is a misstatement of the majority's rationale158 and it misses the
point that it may be rational not to engage in life-cycle pricing159 when it
is expensive and the level of advantage-taking by virtue of market power
is relatively modest. At the heart of Justice Scalia's argument is the point
that "we have never before premised the application of antitrust doctrine
on the lowest common denominator of consumer."'160
154. Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 43-44 (O'Connor, J. concurring).
155. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 501 U.S. 451, 486-504
(1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). For a detailed discussion of the facts, see supra notes 102-12
and accompanying text.
156. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
157. Kodak, 504 U.S. at 494 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
158. The majority distinguished between sophisticated buyers and unsophisticated buy-
ers and did not regard the unsophisticated ones as being "occasional." Id. at 475-76.
159. This would in actuality be a comparison of life-cycle prices of competing products.
160. Kodak, 504 U.S. at 496 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Other than misstating the majority's position, there are two other
problems with Justice Scalia's "lowest common denominator" characteri-
zation. One problem that is not directly relevant is whether those who do
not engage in life-cycle pricing represent the "lowest common denomina-
tor." If life-cycle pricing is not cost-effective, a choice not to make that
analysis may mean one is actually dealing with the highest form of con-
sumer rationality. The implication that life-cycle pricing is the norm is
not supported by Justice Scalia. In any case, the issue represents an em-
pirical question that Justice Scalia skips over. The more important prob-
lem in the context of this article is whether there is an economic rationale
for placing market power resulting from a rational or irrational decision
to forego life-cycle pricing outside the reach of the antitrust laws. There
is no economic rationale for this if one actually adheres to economic
teachings, and Justice Scalia offers no reason for simply exempting this
type of market power from antitrust scrutiny.
Justice Scalia's second argument relates directly to the life-cycle pricing
rationale of the majority. Scalia's reasoning is not terribly revealing on
this point other than to observe that "gaps in the availability and quality
of information... pervade real-world markets"'161 and that the Court has
"never suggested that the principal players in a market with such com-
monplace informational deficiencies .. .exercise market power in any
sense relevant to the antitrust laws."'1 62
His final argument is a response to the majority's switching-cost ratio-
nale. Justice Scalia concedes that, for some period of time, buyers of spe-
cific brands of equipment may be "locked into" purchasing from
manufacturers of that equipment and thus subject to what he labels "cir-
cumstantial" leverage. 163 This leverage, according to Scalia, is no differ-
ent from that possessed by a swimming pool contractor who discovers a
boulder while excavating and demands additional payment. 164 Yet, this is
not "market power in any relevant sense.' 65 Justice Scalia goes on to
make what is called the single monopoly profit argument.' 66 In essence, a
firm with market power can exact only so much from consumers. 167 It
may do this in the form of a higher price or by requiring after-market
purchases. In short, tying requirements cause no further harm.168 What
is missing from Justice Scalia's opinion, and tellingly so, is any reference
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 497
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. See infra Part VI.A.2.
167. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 62, at 421-22; Ward Bowman, Tying Arrangements
and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19, 21 (1957).
168. Justice Scalia also cautions about the "flood of litigation" to follow if these types of
arrangements are permitted to be questioned. Kodak, 504 U.S. at 489 (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing). The "flood of litigation" rationale is always something of a make-weight. There is a
flood only if parties persist in doing what has been found to be questionable conduct.
Presumably, parties would be rational enough not to enter into agreements that were likely
to lead to liability.
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to economic theory that would support exempting some types of market
power from antitrust scrutiny.
When Justice Scalia's opinion is considered along with that of the Jef-
ferson Parish majority, it probably makes sense to think in terms of two
types of non-actionable market power. One type is the "lock-in" result-
ing from an initial investment. This is sometimes referred to as the prob-
lem of an "installed base."'169 This is typically considered from the
perspective of a buyer of original equipment who then has limited choices
in the aftermarket. There are, however, seller-side equivalents. For ex-
ample, a supplier may make an investment in productive capacity in or-
der to serve the needs of a specific customer. At that point, the supplier
may find itself at the mercy of that customer as far as future demand.
170
The other source of power combines Scalia's "irrational consumer" ratio-
nale with his reaction to life-cycle pricing problems and the Jefferson Par-
ish majority's reasoning with respect to third-party payors. In all cases,
consumers, for one reason or another, appear to consent to entering ar-
rangements in which subsequent choices are narrowed.
Justice Scalia's analysis seems to take out of play what might be called
"circumstantial" and "consensual" market power. No doubt these blend
together, but the themes are separate. The first theme -circumstantial
market power-is that market imperfections lead to market power. Con-
sensual market power is linked to the idea that parties expressly or im-
plicitly consent to entering into arrangements under which incomplete
information may lead to their vulnerability to the market power of an-
other party. It is not clear from Justice Scalia's opinion if both elements
are necessary for the resulting market power to be irrelevant, but it seems
doubtful. In other words, circumstantial market power to which one does
not consent is probably not actionable under his view, but if it can be
interpreted as having been consensual, it is definitely not actionable.
A decision to disregard circumstantial and consensual market power
cannot be based on economic reasoning. Economic theory does not dis-
tinguish between sources or types of power when assessing the impact of
monopoly. In all cases, in the absence of innovation, productive efficien-
cies, or network effects, consumer welfare decreases. What is particularly
awkward about the Jefferson Parish and Scalia outcome is that it is funda-
mentally a reaction to transaction costs. Even more awkward is its treat-
ment of these costs. In the normal course of the economic analysis of
law, transaction costs are a problem-they slow down and prevent
wealth-maximizing transfers.1 71 In the case of antitrust law and the allo-
169. See William E. Cohen, Competition and Foreclosure in the Context of Installed
Base and Compatibility Effects, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 535, 535 (1996); Joseph Kattan, Market
Power in the Presence of an Installed Base, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 4-7 (1993).
170. This would involve the use of monoposony power. See BLAIR & HARRISON, supra
note 4, at 36-44.
171. Obviously, a great deal of public policy and regulation is designed to respond to
transactions costs. See JEFFREY L. HARRISON, THOMAS MORGAN & PAUL R. VERKUIL,
REGULATION AND DEREGULATION 176-208 (2d ed. 2004). An obvious example is the ef-
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cation of market power, they have the same effect, but they are viewed as
inconsequential and actually shelter those possessing market power. In
addition to the extent that Justice Scalia's analysis takes on a moralistic
tone-"irrational consumer"172-it suggests that the happenstance of
transaction costs and the windfall monopoly power that may result is a
morally superior outcome. Obviously, there is no basis for that.
V. LOWER COURT RESPONSES
Although bound by the majority opinion in Kodak, the Jefferson Parish
and Scalia view of market power seems to have been more influential
with lower courts. 173 This has been exposed by post-Kodak decisions in
which plaintiffs have attempted to take advantage of the door that case
seemed to open.174 A process has emerged that narrows the scope of
Kodak and diminishes the importance of circumstantial and consensual
market power. 175 The most consistent element of lower court analysis is
an emphasis on consent as a basis for finding an absence of actionable
market power. 176
Perhaps the leading lower court opinion adopting this approach and
limiting the reach of Kodak is Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino's Pizza,
Inc.177 Domino's franchisees agreed as part of the franchise contract to
terms that allowed Domino's to be the exclusive seller of various ingredi-
ents even though ingredients that could meet Domino's specifications
were available on the open market. 78 A franchisee complained that
Domino's had monopolized a market consisting of "the $500 million
aftermarket for sales of supplies to Domino's franchisees. ' 179 As one
would expect, plaintiffs argued that they had a "Kodak case."1 80 The
court rejected the plaintiffs' market definition, reasoning that ingredients
fort to lower the costs of information. See, e.g., Ass'n of Nat'l Advertisers, Inc. v. Lungren,
44 F.3d 726, 731-34 (9th Cir. 1994). See generally Howard Beales, Richard Craswell, &
Stephen C. Salop, The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information, 24 J.L. & EcoN. 491
(1981); George Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213 (1961).
172. Kodak, 504 U.S. at 495 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
173. See generally Benjamin A. Levin, Kenneth R. Costello, Michael J. Lockerby,
Queen City Reigns, Days End Settles with DOJ, Courts Restrict Restrictive Covenants, 19
FRANCHISE L.J. 156, 156-57 (2000).
174. Much has been written about the Kodak and post-Kodak cases, and there is no
need to rehash that discussion here. On the other hand, the cases decided in the aftermath
of Kodak are extremely useful for exposing the resistance of courts to taking an instrumen-
tal view of market power.
175. In this respect, it is important to note that the critical issue is not whether lower
courts disagree on the outcome of the application of the approach but whether they apply
Scalia's non-instrumental approach at all.
176. See, e.g., SMS Sys. Maint. Servs., Inc. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 158 F.3d 11, 20 (1st
Cir. 1999); PSI Repair Servs. v. Honeywell, Inc., 104 F.3d 811, 819-20 (6th Cir. 1997);
Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 124 F.3d 430, 440 (3d Cir. 1997); Little
Caesar Enters. v. Smith, 34 F. Supp. 2d 459, 490-93 (E.D. Mich. 1998); Collins v. Int'l Dairy
Queen, Inc., 980 F. Supp. 1252, 1258-60 (M.D. Ga. 1997).
177. Queen City Pizza, 124 F.3d at 439-40.
178. Id. at 433-34.
179. Id. at 434.
180. Id. at 439.
20061 1699
SMU LAW REVIEW
sold by Domino's to its franchisees were virtually the same as those sold
by others. 81 In effect, a properly defined market would include all the
reasonably interchangeable substitutes. 182 The court was also persuaded
by arguments that Domino's franchisees, in effect, knew that they were
entering into an arrangement under which competitively priced ingredi-
ents might be unavailable. 183
Although appealing on first impression, the court's reasoning with re-
spect to market definition misses the mark. To understand why, it is im-
portant to think in terms of why markets are defined in the first place and
the process of defining them. If one begins by focusing on one firm and
what it sells, the market consists of those producers whose freedom to set
prices limits the ability of the first firm to raise its prices above competi-
tive levels. The functional or chemical identity of a possible substitute is
not the question. Products are in the same market only if buyers have
economically meaningful access to those products.
The Domino's scenario would be comparable to a group of consumers
who voluntarily traveled to an island where there was but one seller of
food. It is true that food remains for sale on their home island but those
prices have limited, if any, impact on the "economic island" where the
travelers are now located. This too is the case in situations like Queen
City Pizza. The lower prices charged by alternative suppliers of ingredi-
ents had no impact on the prices Domino's could charge its franchisees.
This sealing-off of its franchisees meant that they spend $3000 to $10,000
more per year on ingredients.' 84 In fact, franchisees that manufactured
dough were willing to sell it at twenty-five percent to forty percent less
than the franchisees were required to pay Domino's, but were prohibited
from doing so. 185 The court was unable to see past the fact of functional
interchangeability to the reality that there was no economic interdepen-
dence between Domino's and independent suppliers. 86 Underlying this,
however, is the sense that buyers who end up in circumstances are ulti-
mately responsible for their plight and must suffer the consequences.
This idea that a captive group of consumers or franchisees can be sub-
ject to monopoly power is, of course, supposedly offset by consent and
the single monopoly profit theory. The Queen City Pizza court at-
tempted to apply this line of reasoning. It noted that Kodak involved a
unilateral change by the seller, while the Domino's policy was known at
the outset.1 87 Consequently, franchisees could be seen as agreeing to be
charged monopoly prices in the aftermarket. 188 The compensation for
181. Id. at 438-40.
182. The lower court had dismissed the claim based on the failure to allege a relevant
product market. Queen City Pizza, Inc., v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 922 F. Supp. 1055, 1062
(E.D. Pa. 1996).
183. Queen City Pizza, 124 F.3d at 440.
184. Id. at 434
185. Id.
186. Id. at 448.
187. Id. at 440.
188. Id.
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this would be in the form of lower prices for the franchise itself. This
analysis simply begs the question of what is meant by consent. A unilat-
eral change is only relevant because it is a single element in the analysis
of the difficulty of life-cycle pricing. For example, unilateral change does
not necessarily mean that life-cycle pricing is impossible. The astute
buyer of a machine, for example, could, in theory, account for some low
probability of a change resulting in higher prices for replacement parts.
The possibility of a unilateral change is known and could be accounted
for in the price of the original equipment or franchise.' 89 The possibility
of unilateral change makes life-cycle pricing more difficult and less accu-
rate. Conversely, there is no evidence in Queen City Pizza that the mere
lack of a unilateral change somehow made life-cycle pricing easy or accu-
rate. Franchisees would still be in a position of attempting to predict the
future as far as the relative prices of pizza ingredients. In both cases, the
decision not to engage in life-cycle prices may be a rational reaction to
the costs of that analysis. In short, the absence of a unilateral change
does not mean there has been consent to unanticipated market
conditions.
The Queen City Pizza court's effort to distinguish Kodak misses the
mark in another way, revealing how far the court deviates from an eco-
nomically sound approach. The court relies on the fact that Kodak's parts
were unique and that there were no reasonable substitutes, while there
were reasonable substitutes for pizza ingredients. 190 In Kodak, the fact
that the parts were unique was a factor that raised the cost of switch-
ing.191 The Kodak Court does not suggest that, in the absence of unique-
ness, the switching cost problem would necessarily disappear. 192 In other
words, the problem was not that the replacement parts were unique,
but-whether unique or not-they could not be obtained from suppliers
that would offer competitive prices. 193 For example, the same outcome
would hold if Kodak sold replacement parts to a number of resellers but
restricted some purchasers from buying the parts from anyone but Ko-
dak. Availability is, therefore, the issue, not the physical characteristic of
the product. Obviously, alternative suppliers were unavailable to Dom-
ino's franchisees. In effect, the court followed the lead of Justice Scalia's
Kodak dissent and took out of play a number of factors that could ac-
count for a lack of substitutes.
A similar emphasis on consent is found in PSI Repair Services, Inc. v.
Honeywell, Inc.194 The pattern was very similar to Kodak in that Honey-
well sold equipment that could be repaired by Honeywell or ISOs, of
189. In these instances, the buyer or franchisee could be said to receive ex ante compen-
sation for taking the risk of future price increases.
190. Queen City Pizza, 124 F.3d at 439-40.
191. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 476-77 (1992).
192. See id. at 467-77.
193. Id.
194. 104 F.3d 811, 819-20 (6th Cir. 1997).
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which PSI was one.195 Honeywell, however, had arrangements with the
manufacturers of its repair parts under which they would not sell those
parts to the ISOs. 196 Without access to the parts, customers were re-
quired to buy their repair services from Honeywell.1 97 Honeywell
claimed that it lacked market power in the replacement parts market be-
cause it did not possess power in the market for the equipment itself.1 98
PSI, citing the existence of information and switching costs, made what
was essentially a Kodak argument.199
Honeywell argued that, unlike Kodak, its policy was known to purchas-
ers before they bought the equipment.200 This is essentially the argument
that the existence of consent means that there is no actionable market
power. PSI, on the other hand, claimed that substantial information costs
still existed even though the practice itself was known.201 In fact, Honey-
well representatives testified that life-cycle pricing was difficult.202 This
was a consequence of the complexity of the equipment and constant
change.2 03
The court agreed with Honeywell and interpreted the case as one in
which, while there was circumstantial market power resulting from gener-
alized market imperfections, customers had consented because they knew
of the policy.20 4 The question of what the majority in Kodak had said
with respect to the unilateral change was critical. The court interpreted
Kodak as requiring plaintiffs to show unilateral change in order to claim
aftermarket market power and, thus, found for the defendant.205 Inter-
estingly, the court also reasoned that a decision to recognize market
power based on pure information costs in a context in which the buyer
had evidently consented would run afoul of Jefferson Parish.206 In effect,
the only way the court could square its outcome with both Jefferson Par-
ish and Kodak was to interpret the majority opinion in Kodak narrowly.
In the process, any serious attention to economics was lost.
A more sophisticated treatment of the consent issue is found in Little
Caesar Enterprises v. Smith, in which franchisees complained of the re-
quirement that they buy logoed aftermarket items from a single desig-
nated supplier that had the exclusive license to use the Little Caesar's
logo.2 0 7 The contract between the franchisor and franchisees permitted
195. Id. at 814.
196. Id. at 813.
197. Id. at 814.
198. The equipment sold by Honeywell was for controlling manufacturing processes.





204. Id. at 820-21.
205. Id. at 819-20.
206. Id. at 820. This is, of course, reminiscent of Justice Scalia's argument in his Kodak
dissent that the majority position could not be square with Jefferson Parish. Eastman Ko-
dak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 490-93 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
207. Little Caesar Enters. v. Smith, 34 F. Supp. 2d 459, 463-64 (E.D. Mich., 1998).
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the franchisees to purchase supplies-other than those with a logo-from
any previously approved supplier.20 8 The exclusive right to distribute
logoed items was granted to a single firm.2 0 9 Evidently, it was not eco-
nomically feasible for franchisees to purchase logoed supplies from one
source and other supplies from other sources, meaning that the purchase
of non-logoed supplies was tied to purchases of those with a logo and to
the franchise itself-or so the franchisees alleged.210 The exclusivity ar-
rangement between Little Caesar and the single supplier was entered into
prior to the franchise agreements. 211 This gave rise to the argument that
whatever market power or disadvantage the franchisees now experienced
had been consented to. 21
2
The analysis of the court focused on what was known or easily knowa-
ble at the time the franchisees entered into the franchise agreement.
21 3
There were two levels to consider. First, did the franchisees understand
there would be only one supplier of logoed supplies?2 14 Here, the court
held that plaintiffs had sufficient information to understand that they
were taking the risk of purchasing logoed items from the single sup-
plier.21 5 The second question was whether plaintiffs could anticipate at
the time of contracting that the ultimate outcome of buying from a single
supplier of logoed items meant that they were also locked into buying
other items from the same supplier.21 6 The court held that there was a
question of fact with regard to whether information costs with respect to
the second question were sufficiently high to create market power.
2 17
Thus, while stressing the idea of "consent," the court did accept the view
that the problem was more complex than whether a practice was an-
nounced prior to the time of the contract.2 1
8
An inexplicable narrowing of Kodak is found in SMS Systems Mainte-
nance Services, Inc. v. Digital Equipment Corp.2 19 Digital Equipment
("DEC") sold computers that were bundled with a three-year war-
ranty.220 SMS Systems, an independent service organization, claimed
that the result of the three-year warranty was to make the market for
computer repair and servicing less competitive. 221 Having paid for servic-
ing by virtue of the warranty, computer buyers were unlikely to pay twice
208. Id. at 464.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 465-66.
211. Id. at 464.
212. Id. at 490.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 482.
215. Id. at 506.
216. Id. at 507-08.
217. Id. at 508. The court went on to conclude that the plaintiffs had not suffered anti-
trust injury owing to the fact that the defendant had not made use of the power. Id. at 509.
218. See id. at 505-08.
219. 188 F.3d 11, 20 (1st Cir. 1999).




by looking beyond the manufacturer for repair services. 22 2 As in Queen
City Pizza, the court reasoned that computer buyers knew the terms of
the bargain at the outset. If they found the inclusion of the three-year
warranty objectionable, they presumably would buy a different computer
since DEC did not have power in the computer market itself.2 23 Noting
that the use of warranties was a legitimate form of non-price competition,
the court was not persuaded that requiring buyers to also purchase three
years of warranty protection was indicative of market power. 22 4 It distin-
guished Kodak on two grounds. First, the court was persuaded that life-
cycle pricing was made easy by the availability of information to consum-
ers. 225 In addition, the warranty requirement was applied only to future
sales, leaving past buyers unaffected. 226
SMS Systems, however, argued that the policy had implications beyond
customers buying new computers with three-year warranties. 22 7 It
claimed that even though the warranty applied only to new purchasers,
owners of older DEC computers would find themselves locked into DEC
repair service.228 Existing owners were likely to have relationships with
ISOs and investments in DEC-specialized training and software. 22 9 This
led to a quandary. The only way to benefit fully from the warranty that
was bundled with new computers would be to give up the benefits of
prior investments in training and software. Or, buyers could continue
their relationships with ISOs but this would mean writing off the cost of
the bundled warranty. In effect, the training and software operated like
an installed base, making it unlikely that buyers would switch brands in
order to avoid the warranty cost. The impact would be felt by the
ISOs. 230
The court seemed more receptive to this theory and the possibility that
switching costs meant that DEC customers were locked into the three-
year warranty. 231 Moreover, the change to the required three-year war-
ranty was along the lines of a unilateral change with respect to customers
222. Id. at 14.
223. Id. at 18-19.
224. Id. at 14 (citing 3A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST
LAW 55 (1996)).
225. SMS Sys., 188 F.3d at 18-19.
226. Id. at 13-14.
227. Id. at 19-20.
228. Id. at 19-20.
229. Id. at 19.
230. Although possibly correct in outcome with respect to this theory, the court's analy-
sis understates the life-cycle pricing issue. Even though consumers know that they are
buying the warranty, they are unable to determine the price of the computer as opposed to
the price of the warranty. In addition, a determination of whether the bundled product is
more or less expensive than alternatives requires an expensive analysis made best by those
with technical knowledge. Although bundling may make for better deals, the more likely
effect is to raise information costs and make comparison shopping more difficult. Specifi-
cally, by bundling, a seller creates information cost problems and seeks to benefit from the
market power thus created. This is not to say that that court's ultimate conclusion as far as
this point is concerned is the wrong one.
231. SMS Sys., 188 F.3d at 20.
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with whom there was an ongoing relationship. 232 Ultimately, however, it
rejected the theory on the basis of a perspective that stressed consent less
than the proposition that some sources of market power were not of con-
sequence.233 It conceded that DEC computer customers might find
themselves locked in, but distinguished Kodak in an economically irrele-
vant manner:
Even though SMS's lock-in argument relies heavily on Kodak, there
is an important factual distinction between the two cases in regard to
the nature of the alleged switching costs. When the Kodak Court
spoke of switching costs, it referred specifically to the cost of
purchasing new copying equipment.... What prompted the Court to
suggest that switching would be necessary was Kodak's policy of of-
fering parts only to those customers who also purchased service from
it. This meant that if a customer did not turn to Kodak for service, it
could not get parts, and its copy machine eventually would be ren-
dered useless. Here, by contrast, DEC neither withholds parts nor
otherwise precludes any hardware purchaser from using another ser-
vice provider. If a customer prefers to retain an ISO, it does not
need to switch to another computer system.... [T]he only switching
cost at issue is the cost of writing off the portion of the equipment's
purchase price that represents the warranty. If the behavior of con-
sumers and ISOs is any indication, the switching cost is not particu-
larly significant. 234
According to the court, this meant that there was nothing "inherently
anticompetitive ' 235 about the new policy.2 36
Writing off the cost of the warranty-the option available if one
wanted to maintain a relationship with an ISO-is comparable to buying
a computer with a monitor or printer at a price that reflects that bundling
and throwing away the monitor or printer. A numerical example of the
impact may be useful. Suppose the cost of the bundled DEC computer is
$1000, and this includes $300 for the warranty. If the buyer uses an ISO,
the cost is $200 and the cost of a non-DEC computer is $700. The value
of not having to replace training and software is $400. Under these cir-
cumstances, $400 is a switching cost.
The buyer has three choices but prefers a fourth alternative. It can buy
a DEC computer, including the warranty, and make use of that warranty.
It writes off the benefits from its previous investments in ISO service.
The cost is $1400.237 Or, the buyer can buy a DEC computer and have it
serviced independently. The total cost will be $1200, $300 of which is
232. Id. at 19-20.
233. Id. at 20, 21.
234. Id. at 20.
235. Id.
236. More tellingly perhaps, the court also concluded, in the context of summary judg-
ment, that there was no issue of fact as to the impact of the write-off requirement. Id. at
20-21.
237. This involves an assumption that the buyer places a value of $400 on the indepen-
dently supplied DEC service.
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written off. Third, the customer can buy a different brand of computer
and make use of an ISO. Here the total cost is $1300-$700 plus the cost
of switching and the cost of independent service for that computer.2 38 A
fourth choice-purchase the DEC computer and employ an ISO-is the
most preferred and would cost $900 but for the switching costs and the
fact that the computer can only be purchased bundled with service. In
effect, the switching cost in this example is a source of market power that
results in the purchase of an unwanted warranty. It is true that the low-
est-cost option under this scenario does mean that ISO's are left in the
market. In effect, switching costs are a source of market power allowing
the seller to raise its price.
On the other hand, suppose all the values stay the same except the lost
value of ISO training is $150. Now the first option is the most attractive
of those available, and the ISO will be abandoned although it remains the
preferred source of aftermarket service. In effect, tying the warranty to
the computer and forcing the buyer to write off the cost of the computer
to maintain its relationship with an ISO is the equivalent of raising the
price charged by the ISO itself. From the point of view of a competitor,
the ability to raise the price of a rival rather than lower one's own price is
always preferable.
At the very least, under an instrumental approach, the plaintiff's theory
gives rise to a fact question very similar to that in Kodak because the
impact on ISOs is an empirical matter. Inexplicably, given the summary
judgment posture of the case, the court concluded that even if the theory
made sense, there was not sufficient evidence to conclude that the pur-
chasers were locked in.239 For some reason, this conclusion followed
from the court's finding that there was little evidence that customers were
dissuaded from continuing the use of ISOs. 240 Paradoxically, the fact that
consumers appeared willing to pay a premium for the computer-by vir-
tue of paying for an unused warranty-led to the court's conclusion that
there was little chance that there were costs associated with choosing a
different brand and, thus, an absence of market power. 241
A case that was decided differently but that appears not to represent
the majority view2 42 is Collins v. International Dairy Queen, Inc.243 The
pattern was similar to that in Queen City Pizza. Franchisees claimed that
they were locked into buying supplies from Dairy Queen.244 The actual
238. For many, this probably understates the cost since the buyer will now be required
to operate two different systems.
239. SMS Sys., 188 F.3d at 20. See also Marts v. Xerox, Inc., 77 F.3d 1109,1112-13 (8th
Cir. 1996).
240. SMS Sys., 188 F.3d at 20-21.
241. Id.
242. See Levin, Costello & Lockerby, supra note 173, at 156-57.
243. Two opinions are relevant here. In one, the court addressed the tying claim. Col-
lins v. Int'l Dairy Queen, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 875, 883 (M.D. Ga. 1996) [hereinafter DQ1]. In
a subsequent opinion, the court addressed a monopolization claim. Collins v. Int'l Dairy
Queen, 980 F. Supp. 1252, 1258-60 (M.D. Ga. 1997) [hereinafter DQ2].
244. DQI, 939 F. Supp. at 877.
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franchise agreement appeared to grant the right to franchisees to buy
from alternative approved sources, but there was evidence that approval
was not easily obtained.2 45 The court disagreed with the Queen City
Pizza court's view that Kodak246 only applied to instances in which the
product in question was unique.2 47 Instead, it took the broader perspec-
tive that Kodak was actually about "information and switching costs
which limit ... choices.' ' 24 8 Consequently, it was not necessary for the
aftermarket product to be unique for the seller of original equipment to
have market power in the aftermarket. 249 The court stressed that Dairy
Queen franchisees were not able, at the point of contracting with Dairy
Queen, to anticipate the difficulties of buying supplies from alternative
sources. 250 In addition, the court noted that switching from one franchise
to another would require a significant additional investment.2 5 1 The re-
sult in Collins was different from Queen City Pizza principally because
the court was sensitive to the complexity of assessing information and
switching costs.
VI. THE CURRENT NONECONOMIC APPROACH
TO ANTITRUST
Several things seem out-of-kilter with respect to the application of eco-
nomics to modem antitrust law. Two principle problems are evident.
The first is the failure to aggressively question prevailing generalizations
about economic matters through the use of empirical methods. These
might be termed "micro" issues. Whether this neglect is a direct result of
philosophical influences or just a failure to understand the economic is-
sues at stake is not clear. The second problem is the selective use of
economics in shaping antitrust policy and in the analysis of specific issues.
This problem is more "macro" in nature. For example, courts appear to
use more economically sophisticated approaches to the issue of market
definition and the assessment of market power. On the other hand, the
economic rationality of the position that monopoly is presumptively legal
goes unchallenged. At times, it seems clear that deference to economic
analysis ends when it impinges on closely held political or normative be-
liefs. These two problems will be discussed in turn.
245. Id. at 881-82.
246. At the time of its decision in DQ1, the court was responding the to the district
court opinion in Queen City Pizza. See DQ1, 939 F. Supp. at 883; Queen City Pizza v.
Domino's Pizza, 922 F. Supp. 1055 (E.D. Pa. 1996). By the time DQ2 was decided, the
Court of Appeals opinion in Queen City Pizza was available. See DQ2, 980 F. Supp. at
1256-58.
247. DQ2, 980 F. Supp. at 1257-58.
248. Id. at 1258.
249. See also Wilson v. Mobil Oil Corp., 940 F. Supp 944, 952 (E.D. La. 1996).
250. DQ2, 980 F. Supp. at 1260.
251. Id. at 1260-61.
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A. NONECONOMIC APPROACH TO ANTITRUST: THE MICRO ISSUES
Two inquiries in particular are symptomatic of judicial difficulties when
it comes to empirically-based questions. The first is the "consent" notion
of market power.252 Specifically, what does consent mean as an eco-
nomic matter and how important is it? The second is the continued ac-
ceptance of the single monopoly profit theory.
1. The Economics of Antitrust "Consent"
As described above, since Kodak, consent has been the focus of a num-
ber of lower court opinions. In reality, all market power can be linked to
a series of consensual steps of one type or another, so it is important to be
precise about the consent involved here. This is not a simple matter.
One possibility is that people who consent to a contract that obligates
them to aftermarket purchases cannot be "forced" in the technical sense
as required by Jefferson Parish. Another related but more technical pos-
sibility is that consent means that a buyer has engaged in life-cycle pricing
or could do so relatively easily. In theory this means a buyer-a fran-
chisee perhaps-factors into the initial franchise fee the possibility that it
will be required to pay supracompetitive prices for aftermarket supplies.
Knowing this and assuming the franchisor has no power in the franchise
rights market, the franchise fee is adjusted downward. If the franchisor
competes with other franchisors, the total cost of the package cannot ex-
ceed competitive levels. The customers of the buyer, so the theory goes,
will pay no more because the franchise fee and the costs of aftermarket
supplies even out. In effect, franchisees have consented in advance (ex
ante) to paying higher prices for supplies by virtue of the lower franchise
fee.
There are two problems with a theory of nonactionable market power
based on life-cycle pricing and ex ante compensation. Two examples illus-
trate the problem. In one example, the typical franchise case, several
franchisees with little business experience and just enough funding agree
to a lock-in like that in Queen City Pizza. They know something about
the risks of obligating themselves to aftermarket purchases but are not
sophisticated. If the prices go above what they anticipated, it is just the
outcome of a bad decision. That bad decision does, however, mean wel-
fare losses to the public generally since higher prices for ingredients and a
miscalculated life-cycle price means higher prices for final output. The
public is worse off by virtue of poor decision-making. A functional ap-
proach to market power would not excuse the use of power simply be-
cause it was the consequence of bad judgment. Economic theory does
not ask why the power to raise prices came into existence. Moreover, the
idea turns the oft-cited notion that the antitrust laws are about competi-
252. In all cases, there was a point at which buyers could have made a different choice
and, had enough consumers followed, none of the industrial giants of the past would have
emerged. Moreover, in all of these cases, some element of irrationality or market imperfec-
tion got in the way of picking an alternative.
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tion, not competitors, 253 on its head. The idea is that harm to specific
competitors is not the focus of antitrust unless that harm can be traced to
harm to the market more generally. But the Jefferson Parish and Scalia
view, as illustrated in the cases above, indicates that even if it is harmful
to competition, it is nonactionable if the plaintiff is judged to be complicit
in its emergence. Under that view, the entire issue turns on competitors
and their actions and not on the actual competitive impact.
A second example may be more common in practice but is only in the
early stages of litigation.2 54 Suppose a relatively small supplier to a large
buyer must make substantial investments in equipment and training in
order to perform its side of a contract. This equipment is only useful to
supply a specific buyer or a small group of buyers. The tacit understand-
ing is that there will be more contracts to come. Clearly, the supplier who
makes the investment without an enforceable promise of future business
has relied on "trust" rather than a contract and made a poor judgment.
When the next opportunity comes around to supply that buyer, the seller
finds that the price offered has fallen because the buyer knows the seller
has no other reasonably substitutable ways to use the equipment.2 55 The
"bad judgment" here again is the result of consent, but the outcome is
that the consent has resulted in the creation of monopsony power that
may eventually impact social welfare. The instrumental approach to mar-
ket power focuses on power and its consequences in terms of social wel-
fare, not on the activities leading to the acquisition of that power. More
specifically, buyers of bundled items can get it wrong, and there seems to
be little reason for the resulting market power and its harmful effects to
be placed outside the reach of antitrust law. Or, in Justice Scalia's terms,
the action of "irrational buyers" should not mean that those possessing
monopoly power are sheltered.
Although the above arguments suggest that consent is not a sufficient
reason to take these types of power outside the realm of market power,
there is an additional question of whether these cases actually involve a
meaningful notion of consent. In a franchisee deal, for example, there is
a risk allocation. In Queen City Pizza, the franchisees found themselves
paying as much as $10,000 per year more for supplies.256 In many areas
of law, notions of foreseeability place limits on what people are viewed as
having consented to. For example, in contracts cases, when there is a
breach, parties do not recover lost profits that were unforeseeable.2 57
The idea is that there is a limit to what a contracting party consents to.
Similarly, in tort law, proximate cause is used to shelter a defendant from
damages because that eventuality is unlikely to have had an impact on
253. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962).
254. See generally Complaint, Auto Indus. Supplier Employee Stock Ownership Plan v.
Snapp Sys., Inc., No. 03-74357 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 17, 2005).
255. This involves the use of power on the selling side of the market, or monopsony
power. See generally BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 4.
256. Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 124 F.3d 430, 434 (3d Cir. 1997).
257. See 3 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 255-57 (3d ed. 2004).
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the party's action. 258 There is no economically sound reason not to rec-
ognize these principles in antitrust law. In fact, a broad notion of consent
under which the actual reasonable expectations of the parties are ignored
is more like strict liability. Thus, the franchisees in Queen City Pizza may
have consented to some price fluctuations, but there was no real consent
for fluctuation beyond some point. The argument that there is no market
power to which the antitrust laws are designed to respond simply lacks
any principled backing. Even if one were to accept the view that buyers
are "compensated" for the risk that aftermarket prices are high, there is a
limit to the risk assumed. Beyond the limit, buyers are paying above
competitive prices even when the entire package is considered and the
contract is simply the tool used to facilitate the use of that market power.
Overlying this analysis is the question of what is meant by rationality in
the context of business decision-making. Rationality to Justice Scalia
means profit maximization for businesses and utility maximization for
consumers. The debate over whether firms maximize profit has been
well-documented.259 In addition, even a "rational" firm will invest in life-
cycle pricing only to the extent that the marginal cost of doing so is less
than the marginal benefit. 260 The same analysis would apply to consum-
ers in terms of utility. Consequently, the failure to engage in life-cycle
pricing and then enter into aftermarket obligations is hardly a reliable
indicator of irrationality or a fully informed choice. Moreover, providing
antitrust protection only to those who operate in the rarified air of "ra-
tionality" may provide shelter for a great deal of anticompetitive conduct.
2. The Single Monopoly Profit Theory
The second principle mistake that is found in judicial applications of
economics to antitrust lies in the dogged adherence to the single monop-
oly profit theory. The main application is in the context of tying, but the
reasoning can be applied whenever leverage-type issues arise.261 The the-
ory, as most readers know, is that a certain amount of market power can
only generate a finite amount of profit. The idea that a firm possessing
market power can project that power into another market and increase
the amount of monopoly profits is regarded as false. More specifically,
suppose a firm has monopoly power in one market. It can then raise
258. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 264
(5th ed. 1984).
259. See Armen Alchian, The Basis of Some Recent Advances in the Theory of Manage-
ment of the Firm, 14 J. INDUS. ECON. 30, 30-34 (1965). Fritz Machlup, Theories of the Firm:
Marginalist, Behavioral, Managerial, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 2-6 (1967).
260. The calculation would involve determining the expected benefits of increased in-
vestment. This means multiplying any possible benefit by the probability that it will actu-
ally be realized.
261. A firm that uses its monopoly power to depart from competitive outcomes is using
"leverage." The term is typically used to describe instances in which that power is exer-
cised outside the market in which it is possessed to influence outcomes in the second mar-
ket. See, e.g., Ward Bownaan, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE
L.J. 19, 20 (1957).
[Vol. 591710
Market Power and Antitrust Policy
prices in that market or exact something else from buyers. This "some-
thing else" may be the requirement that buyers purchase a tied good. To
the extent the firm is charging a profit-maximizing price in the first mar-
ket and then attempts to force consumers into an unwanted purchase in
the second market, the firm has effectively raised the price in the first
market. Thus, in order to maintain prices at profit-maximizing levels, it
would have to eliminate the tie or lower prices in the market for the tying
product. It is through this line of reasoning that an argument is made that
there can be no market power in an aftermarket if there is not power in
the market for the original equipment. In addition, even if there is power
in the original equipment market, the firm possessing the power can do
no further harm by engaging in a tie.262 Consequently, as Justice Scalia's
Kodak dissenting opinion demonstrates, this is a theory that markets
work perfectly, at least eventually.
Tacit or express acceptance of the single monopoly profit is one way to
sweep under the rug a great deal of market power. But the theory has
problems in terms of the assumptions it requires and empirical tests that
have been performed.263 One problem is evident even from the way the
theory is labeled. Somehow, the fact that only one monopoly profit is
obtainable is regarded as a satisfactory reason for not prohibiting some
activities. In other words, there is a tacit concession that the monopolist
is entitled to at least one monopoly profit. The fact that this concession
exists is consistent with the view that monopoly is presumptively legal.
Yet there is no support for this view if social welfare is taken into account.
In addition, as the previous paragraphs point out, this theory attributes
a great deal of rationality to buyers and sellers in original equipment mar-
kets with respect to prices charged to other buyers in aftermarkets. As a
general matter, the slippage between the theory of how markets must
work for the single monopoly profit theory to make sense and how mar-
kets actually work has led to a great deal of criticism in the post-Chicago
era of antitrust.264
Ironically, the theory also attributes a lack of sophistication to sellers.
After all, if there is but one monopoly profit, why engage in tying and
bundling? The answer for adherents of the theory goes something like
this: since there can be only one monopoly profit, tying and bundling
262. Even under this theory, however, the monopolist may increase profit-just not the
profit associated with market power. For example, if the tie results in efficiencies, some of
the benefit may flow to the monopolist and some to buyers.
263. See, e.g., Deborah Haas-Wilson, Tying Requirements in Markets with Many Sellers:
The Contact Lens Industry, 69 REV. ECON. & STAT. 170, 173-74 (1987); Margaret E. Slade,
The Leverage Theory of Tying Revisited: Evidence from Newspaper Advertising, 65 S.
ECON. J. 204, 220 (1998); Michael D. Whinston, Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion, 80 AM.
ECON. REv. 837, 855-56 (1990).
264. See, e.g., Herbert Hovemkamp, Post-Chicago Antitrust: A Review and Critique,
2001 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 257, 283-91; Michael S. Jacobs, An Essay on the Normative
Foundations of Antitrust Economics, 74 N.C.L. REV. 219, 241-45 (1995); Louis Kaplow,
Extension of Monopoly Power Through Leverage, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 515, 532-36 (1985):
Robert Lande, Chicago Takes It on the Chin: Imperfect Information Could Play a Role in
the Post-Kodak World, 62 ANTrTRUST L.J. 193, 197-99 (1993).
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must be designed to increase profit in other ways, many of which benefit
consumers. 265 There is, however, another explanation. In the world of
sellers, price comparisons of similar products means the necessity of
meeting the prices of rivals. One way to avoid this is to bundle goods
together. The effect is to raise the cost of comparisons and to require
buyers to invest more in determining the actual price being paid. 266 In
effect, bundling can be a method of increasing profits. Granted, here one
can get into an issue of semantics. Is it that the monopolist is only able to
extract the one profit to which it is "entitled" by bundling? Or, is it that
bundling enables the firm to increase its monopoly profit? Even if the
answer is the first relatively benign possibility, one must still confront the
issue of whether antitrust law should shelter firms that are only able to
achieve their one monopoly profit by disguising price increases by raising
search costs. It is ultimately welfare-reducing not just in terms of lower
output and higher prices but in terms of the resources used strictly to
affect a redistribution. 267
B. NONECONOMIC APPROACH TO ANTITRUST: THE MACRO VIEW
Ultimately, the rejection of an instrumental view of market power or
the failure of such an approach to emerge cannot be attributed to a lack
of economic sophistication by those who claim to rely on economics. This
phenomenon must instead be a symptom of something larger that results
in a selective reliance on economics. In particular, economics as a disci-
pline cannot distinguish among the types of market power that are the
subject of the antitrust laws and those that are not.268 Judges do, how-
ever, make that decision. Thus, the political world of antitrust decision-
making is full of conflicts. The most widely understood effects of monop-
oly are largely ignored. At the same time, complex theories that are de-
pendent on unsupported assumptions are routinely employed to find no
liability. Oddly, the fact that a monopolist can make but one monopoly
profit becomes a reason for presuming that monopolies are not harmful.
Similarly, an entire theory devoted to the impact of transaction costs on
allocative efficiency goes unnoticed.
What is most obvious is that the decision not to employ antitrust law in
an instrumental fashion with respect to market power is a political deci-
sion and not an economic one. To be sure, at this point in the evolution
of antitrust law, it would be difficult to change direction completely. At
least some of what happens today can be attributed to judicial inertia.
265. It is important to note that the single monopoly profit theory does not mean that
profits cannot be increased. It means that the profits attributed to market power itself are
limited.
266. This is not, however, the primary objection to bundling. The primary objection is
that it may exclude competing firms that do not have the product diversity necessary to
permit selling a combination of products. See Thomas A. Lambert, Evaluating Bundled
Discounts, 89 MINN. L. REv. 1688, 1697-98 (2005).
267. See POSNER, supra note 10, at 252.
268. See generally Reza Dibadj, Saving Antitrust, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 745, 825-31
(2004); Jacobs, supra note 264, at 255-58.
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Still, at the time of Alcoa and for at least some time thereafter, an instru-
mental approach was a possibility. Ironically, those possibilities dwindled
when economics became the authoritative discipline. A partial explana-
tion for the rejection of an instrumental approach lies in the fact that it
was not just economics that came to the forefront but neoclassical eco-
nomics. Those wedded to that version of economics ultimately believe
that markets have within them self-correcting tendencies. For example,
shortages in markets draw forth increases in supply. Monopolies attract
investors and this means increases in competition. If accurate, however,
these basic ideas only lead to empirical questions. Namely, they lead to
the empirical question of whether clumsy government efforts to address
problems of competition are always inferior to market self-correction. In
other words, are government efforts that have some beneficial impact in,
say, ten years, always inferior to, say, a twenty-year period of market self-
correction? How is that decision affected by the fact that during the extra
ten years, in addition to the direct welfare loss of monopoly, those with
market power will expend massive resources in efforts to protect their
position?
If purely economic considerations lead to an instrumental approach-
or at least require one to address the empirical validity of alternative ap-
proaches-then the choice not to adopt that perspective comes down to
two factors. One factor is a blind faith that the empirical question of
clumsy government action versus long-term market correction always or
nearly always comes out one way. The other factor is a reference to pure
ideology. This ideology comes packaged as the positive science of eco-
nomics, but it is ideology nonetheless. Indeed, economics may simply be
a convenient tool to those wishing to advance that ideology.
What characterizes an ideology that accepts monopoly power as some-
thing not to be tampered with even though, as far as its welfare-reducing
effects, it cannot be distinguished from the most common crimes? It must
be an ideology that reflects a view that efforts to eliminate the cost of
monopoly will do more harm than good. The questions then come down
to what is "harm" and what is "good." In the context of a true economic
approach, these terms are reflected as "utility" or "wealth." In the con-
text of Supreme Court jurisprudence, other values have come into play,
particularly in the years since the early 1970s when the disassembling of
antitrust began.269 More specifically, what is likely to be objectionable-
as a political matter-about the application of antitrust? One can "back
into" an answer to this question by thinking in terms of what would it
mean to have an antitrust policy that did begin from the premise that
monopolies are presumptively illegal. At its core it would involve the
federal government in redistribution efforts.
269. This disassembly has involved far more than elevating monopolies to presump-
tively legal status. Since 1977, the Supreme Court has also narrowed the range of activities
that are violations per se of antitrust law and, using various standing and antitrust injury
devices, reduced the pool of possible plaintiffs.
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Both of these aspects of a welfare-increasing antitrust policy are likely
to be objectionable. An instrumental approach to monopoly power
would lead to redistributions of wealth from those benefiting from mo-
nopoly pricing to those who are harmed. The typical argument is that it is
impossible to know the welfare effects of this redistribution because it
involves an interpersonal comparison of utility and the ultimate winners
and losers are unknowable. These may be valid points, but what is also
known is that the elimination of monopolies other than those giving rise
to innovation, productive efficiencies, and network effects increases over-
all welfare by increasing consumer welfare by more than it decreases pro-
ducer welfare. In short, the overall impact may be beneficial, but it
comes at the price of altering the status quo regarding wealth
distributions.
A strong and active antitrust policy also requires the involvement of
the federal government in business affairs. This too has been regarded as
a "harm" by the Court over the past several decades, as it has narrowed
the reach of the federal government.2 70 Perhaps most on point, the Court
has expanded the range of state-directed activities that stand outside the
reach of the federal antitrust law.2 71 The net result is a squeezing down
of trade regulation to state and local levels.2 72 This has occurred without
any empirical evidence that, from a strictly economic perspective,273
there is an excessive enforcement of the antitrust laws by federal
agencies.
What it suggests is that it is incorrect to think of federal antitrust policy
as somehow responsive to trends in economic theory. Instead, it seems
much more likely that economic considerations have been trumped by
the political leaning of the Court. To be sure, there have been signs, most
pronounced in Kodak, that a majority of the Court was receptive to what
is called the "post-Chicago" view of how markets work or do not work.2 74
The promise of Kodak, in so far as it stands for an antitrust policy based
on empiricism as opposed to ideology, has, however, not been realized.
Moreover, regardless of the thinking and writing of those economists who
most influence antitrust policy, a true economically sensitive policy is un-
likely to occur before a shift in the Supreme Court's view of the rightful
role of the federal government more generally. In short, the future of
antitrust, as always, may be in the hands of those who are appointed to
the bench, but economics is not and is unlikely to become the determin-
ing factor with respect to the path taken.
270. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995).
271. See Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 46-47 (1985).
272. For an interesting application of antitrust market definition to the Commerce
Clause, see Bruce Johnsen & Moin A. Yahya, The Evolution of Sherman Act Jurisdiction:
A Roadmap for Competitive Federalism, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 403 (2004).
273. In the context of economics, "excessive" means enforcement to the extent of re-
ducing any overall measure of social welfare.
274. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 472-78 (1992).
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VII. SUMMARY
It may surprise law professors but not economists to learn that monop-
oly power always decreases social welfare unless the harm is offset by
innovation, productive efficiency, or network effects. In fact, in a perfect
market with the absence of transaction costs and wealth effects, those
who are harmed by monopolies would be able to purchase the "right" of
monopolies to exist. Thus, it is paradoxical that an antitrust policy that
claims to adhere to the teaching of economics begins with the premise
that monopolies are presumptively lawful.
Against this backdrop, this Article describes what antitrust policy to-
ward monopoly power would likely be if economic theory really did guide
antitrust policy. That policy-an instrumental approach-would permit
the possession of market power only as long as the benefits exceed the
harms. This is very far, however, from what exists today. In fact, anti-
trust policy now reflects the view that monopoly power is actionable or
not actionable based on its origin. Thus, market power acquired as a re-
sult of a windfall or market perfections is increasingly viewed as immune
from the prohibitions of antitrust law. Yet, as a matter of economic the-
ory, the source of monopoly power is unrelated to the harm that may
result from the use of that power. This inconsistent view of monopoly
power is most evident in the reaction of lower courts to the Supreme
Court's 1992 Kodak decision.
If antitrust policy does not reflect the teaching of economic theory,
what does it reflect? As with most matters, it reflects ideology. The ideol-
ogy most consistent with the state of antitrust law today is one that pro-
tects the status quo regarding the distributions of wealth and income and
favors a limited role of the federal government. In furthering those poli-
cies in the context of antitrust law, basic economic teachings are ignored
while complex assumption-dependent theories that absolve monopolies
are embraced. In this context, the thirty-year long period of antitrust dis-
assembly cannot be attributed to economics.
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